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ABSTRACT 
 
 SHERROD, JESSICA     The Fragmentation of Collective Action in 
 Contemporary China:  Micro-region and Occupation. Department of Asian 
 Studies, March 2012.  
 
 ADVISOR: Mark Dallas  
 
 Since the creation of labor markets in China, there has been a rapid increase in 
collective contentious action, such as striking and protesting, and this has attracted the 
attention of many scholars. Because the country contains such a myriad of diverse 
regions, scholars have commonly analyzed Chinese collective action through a 
“regional” lens. While that approach has been useful, this paper goes further by 
disaggregating Chinese collective action along two dimensions: by micro-region and by 
occupational sector. More specifically, this research disaggregates large macro-regions 
to show diversity at the city-level within regions. It also considers differences in 
collective action across occupations and industries, such as transportation workers and 
factory workers in the auto parts, electronics and textiles industries. To illustrate this 
disaggregated approach, I have constructed a searchable database of collective action in 
China over the past years, which consists of 94 verified cases of collective action. These 
cases have demonstrated that the targets of and reasons for collective action among 
China’s regions have been far less general and uniform than scholars have projected. In 
disaggregating collective action within many of China’s vast regions and across 
occupational groups, I have developed a new framework to analyze China’s collective 
action. 
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Chapter One: 
Introduction 
 
 
 It was a blistering afternoon in the beginning of May, the month considered by 
many to be the peak season in production for the Honda Auto Parts Manufacturing Co. 
Ltd (CHAM). Due to it being the busiest time of the year, an assembly worker named 
Huang was not surprised to find himself working longer hours, faster, and harder to help 
ensure that his section of the assembly line in this Honda company factory would make 
its yearly quota. Huang had an idea of what might happen if his department did not 
make quota: lower wages and more hours with little or no compensation for these 
gruesome hours. Huang looked around his station. New interns surrounded him. The 
interns the company hired were usually students, either recently graduated or students 
who were working part time and still continuing their studies. Either way, Huang was 
disappointed to see so many interns. A few of his coworkers had been fired and 
replaced by these workers. Working on the assembly line required no previous working 
experience and is considered a low-skill job; however, the wage gap between interns 
and senior workers like Huang was tremendous. Huang would be making about 700 
yuan a month in comparison to the 400-500 yuan the interns would be earning. On a 
lighter note, Huang reassured himself that interns were good for the company because 
of their low wages. If the company hired more interns, paying them less, then 
potentially those excess funds could be allocated elsewhere and he could get a raise 
along with his other coworkers; however, Huang was aware of how infrequent raises 
were, if there were even any to be given at all. Interns had their downfalls though. 
Working on the assembly line was a fast-paced job. Every worker would be given a 
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personal quota to make and if that mark was not reached, then the worker would be 
punished. The quota was not unreasonable; however, even a couple of minor errors 
could disrupt the entire assembly, affecting not only the person who makes the 
mistake(s), but also every person down the line. The first time a worker failed to make 
quota he would be sent to speak with the management. The second time a worker did 
not make quota, he would receive a fine (usually taken out of his paycheck). If a worker 
missed his quota a third time, the worker would be released and forced to find work 
elsewhere. Huang, being a senior employee, was a well-conditioned assembly worker; 
the interns were not. Huang thought they were slow and usually disrupted the pace of 
the entire production line. Working on the assembly line, Huang had grown bored, 
agitated, and tired of the same old repetition the assembly life offered. Next to him on 
the assembly line worked an intern. The boy could not have been older than 20, he was 
unskilled and a slow worker – this only added to Huang’s frustration. Earlier in the 
week Huang had been informed that a Honda factory in the next district had had a few 
complications and as a result their production had stopped. Huang did not know what 
these complications were; however, he knew that they must have been large enough if 
they had caused a complete halt in assembly line production. Although Honda had had 
some minor complications last week, he had also heard rumors that Honda’s Chinese 
partner, Guangzhou Automobile Group (GAC) had been doing very well.1 Huang knew 
that his company in Guangzhou was doing well, but he did not know how well, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 In automobile manufactures, the cost of the power control is estimated to share about 20% of the total 
production cost and more than 30% of the profit. Compared with other auto companies in China, Honda, 
and its partner GAC are reported to have the highest per car profit margin. This is largely earned from the 
margins gained in the auto parts procurement in China. IHLO: “A Political Economic Analysis of the 
Strike in Honda and the Auto Parts Industry in China,” 2010, 3.  
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 According to the statistics of the China Automobile Association, Shanghai 
 Volkswagen was the best selling auto company in China 2009 and yet it was 
 only fourth most profitable company. GAC ranked 6th in terms of the number of 
 cars sold and yet it was the second most profitable auto company in China  2009. 
 Thanks to the market performance of Honda and Toyota, GAC reported revenue 
 of USC 1.79 billion and a profitable rate of 10.37% in 2009, which is above 
 average profit rage of 7.7% of the auto sector in China.2 
 
Although Huang did not know these specific statistics pertaining to the growth rate of 
Honda and GAC, he had an idea that he deserved to be making more than he was 
relative to the productivity his line was keeping up. Huang understood that he was just 
another body to fill a spot on the assembly line, and he was well versed in what would 
happen if he were to stop working. However, the consequences did not stop him when 
he finally decided he had had enough. At 7:50am May 17th, Huang pressed a button and 
halted his production line. He yelled: “The wage is so low, stop doing your work!” 
More than 50 colleagues followed him to walk out. On their way out, these colleagues 
went back to their departments and asked other workers to join them, but they were not 
successful. Huang and his fellow colleagues went outside. The Japanese management 
tried to communicate with Huang, becoming afraid once they realized that this 
rebellious action was spreading around the factory through text messages amongst 
employees. The interns from other departments soon caught on to Huang’s movement 
and also walked out. After the 37th transmission was assembled, production came to a 
complete halt. CHAM workers went on strike for 4 days, all demanding the same thing: 
that their wage demands be met. This dispute continued from May 17th until the first 
week in June, becoming one of the longest protests the Auto Industry had ever faced. 
The workers in the CHAM-Honda sector, by laying down their tools for 4 days, brought 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 Table Two: Income and Profit of the Auto Companies in China 2009, IHLO: “A Political Economic 
Analysis of the Strike in Honda and the Auto Parts Industry in China,” 2010, 8.  
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the production of 4 Honda assembly subsidiaries to a halt causing the company to lose 
220 million yuan by estimates.3 
 There are many details explaining the specifics of the Honda strike; however, 
the first and most important point to illustrate is that the low income of CHAM workers 
contrasted sharply with the profit Honda and GAC were making,4 
 Honda reported a net profit of USD 1.5 billion worldwide in 2008. Out of  that, 
 USD 1.3 billion was generated from the China market. The  performance of 
 Honda in 2009 continued to benefit from the persisted sales increase in Asia 
 and costs retrenchment. The net income of Honda in 2009 reached USD 2.86 
 billion despite the downfall in the major markets other than Asia and 
 China.5 
 
If Honda could be making such a large margin net profit, then why were grade 1 
workers like Huang receiving a basic wage of only 675 yuan compared with the legal 
minimum of 720 yuan (which was increased to 920 yuan just before the strike) in 
Foshan city?6 In actuality, the salary and welfare of Honda grade 1 and 2 employees, as 
well as interns, is significantly lower than workers in the GAC sector.7 However, it is 
common to see low wages in the auto parts sector. Secondly, it is important to question 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 IHLO: “A Political Economic Analysis of the Strike in Honda and the Auto Parts Industry in China,” 
2010, 10. 
4 IHLO: “A Political Economic Analysis of the Strike in Honda and the Auto Parts Industry in China,” 
2010, 10. 
5 Zhang, S.S 2010. IHLO: A Political Economic Analysis of the Strike in Honda and the Auto Parts 
Industry in China, 2010, 8.  
6 The salary of grade 2 workers is slightly higher between 1500-1600 yuan. The conditions of the inter 
workers who made up to 30% of the total workforce were worse. They were paid a basic wage of 500 
yuan and a monthly income of around 900 yuan including allowances. IHLO: A Political Economic 
Analysis of the Strike in Honda and the Auto Parts Industry in China, 2010, 8. 
7 The remuneration and welfare of the assembly line workers in GAC- Honda is significantly different 
from those of the auto parts workers in CHAM. GAC-Honda has a more egalitarian income structure. A 
probation worker receives nearly 3,000 yuan a month to be increased within 20% after the probation ends. 
Interns are not used on large scales, which is also significant because interns are widely used in the 
CHAM-Honda sector. GAC-Honda incorporates overtime compensation, allowance for special work, 
allowances for work under high temperature, for late marriage/late pregnancy; and bonuses linked to 
corporate profit. As a result of the high revenue earned by the company, all workers were paid 18/5 
months’ salary a year in 2008 and 2009. In sum, a GAC-Honda assembly line worker is receiving, by 
rough estimate, an annual salary between 50,000-60,000 yuan, which is higher than the market median. 
IHLO: A Political Economic Analysis of the Strike in Honda and the Auto Parts Industry in China, 2010, 
9-13. 
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CHAM-Honda’s motives in paying their employee’s such low wages. The answer to 
this question will be explored later on in this paper.  
 In questioning CHAM-Honda’s motives, one may conclude that CHAM-Honda 
was not concerned with keeping their workers content, but rather (only) in furthering 
their own industrialization growth both nationally and globally.8 It is apparent that 
statistically speaking, as a joint foreign enterprise CHAM-Honda has had success in 
many of its locations; however, these gains have not been felt or communicated to its 
workforce by way of positive reinforcement, such as rewarding the workers with wage 
increases or benefits packages.  The CHAM-Honda protest highlights an isolated 
incident of collective action; however, it has become quite common for workers who 
feel they have been improperly treated by managers, both in rural and urban settings, to 
retaliate in the fashion that Huang did. Workers all over the country have retaliated in 
the fashion that Huang did as well as taking to the streets. Huang’s strike method can be 
classified as an “upfront” technique because he physically stopped working and 
convinced others to follow him. Huang’s main concern was stopping production first 
before addressing the real issue – unfair wages. However, there is something to be said 
for the courage involved in Huang’s “upfront” method. China remains a country where 
independent unions have been outlawed, and workers that do join together and fight for 
their rights can at times do more harm than good. Huang, simply by being the one 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 Compared with other towns in Foshan city where domestic capital plays key role industrialization, the 
development of Shishan town has been lagging behind and the catch up was mainly driven by foreign 
investment mainly in the auto parts and related industries. Within 5 years, the economic value of Shishan 
town expanded three times from 16.6 billion yuan in 2004 to more than 45 billion yuan in 2009. By 2009, 
Foshan city already has 300 auto parts companies of which 107 of them are joint ventures. Shishan town 
of Foshan city, where CHAM is located, has attracted more than 50 auto parts companies and the 
aggregate investor of these enterprises amounts to 2.42 billion yuan. Their investment has booted the 
industrial value of the auto related sector by 2009. IHLO: A Political Economic Analysis of the Strike in 
Honda and the Auto Parts Industry in China, 2010, 15. 	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responsible for halting production, severely jeopardized his chances of returning to his 
job back at the factory. The question then becomes, what other option did he have to 
better his chances of being treated more fairly by local managers? Information has not 
been disclosed whether Huang and his fellow coworkers were admitted back to work 
upon reconciliation between workers and CHAM-Honda.  
 The CHAM-Honda strike illustrates two of the major contributions of this thesis. 
The strike occurred in a specific (micro) region and within a specific industrial sector, 
Foshan and the auto parts sector respectively. I will explain the importance of 
identifying both a strike’s micro region and the industrial sector it occurs within later in 
this paper.  Another aspect of this particular CHAM-Honda strike worthy of recognition 
is that it received media coverage from over 10 global newspapers, some of these 
sources including the Wall Street Journal and London Financial Times, as well as 
national papers including Shanghai Daily and the Hong Kong Press. The significance of 
this incident should be relatively easy to see: as China has progressed economically, the 
world has become increasingly aware and interested in focusing on the finer details 
occurring internally within the country. China may be publically displaying economic 
growth, but it has also suffered a significant amount of internal social discontent. China 
has entered into an era where GDP illustrates economic stability and political faces 
illustrate how well your government is operated; however, behind the apparent 
economic successes and political gains China has made, China has involuntarily entered 
into an era of labor activism. While China’s GDP is consistently on the rise, workers 
wage increases have been slow. This is particularly relevant to CHAM-Honda. Perhaps 
workers were not privy to the specific details, but Huang and workers like him had 
	  	   7	  
enough awareness to be able to question why their company’s successes were not being 
reflected in the wages they paid the members of their workforce(s). It is, after all, hard 
workers like Huang who allow any given company to thrive. Another important point to 
delve into is that collective action in China is unique. In the majority of reported 
incidents, there is no “official leader” and information regarding the details of protests 
is often difficult to obtain. Additionally, while some of the time activism remains 
isolated, at other times it can become more integrated when workers from one company 
join forces with those from another, similarly to what happened in the CHAM-Honda 
incident. Once the widespread nature of China’s social discontent has been highlighted, 
one should begin to see that with an issue so large, a certain degree of attention must be 
brought to it in order to understand the intricate, underlying details of the protests 
occurring in China today.  
 
 
I. The Main Idea: Collective Action in Contemporary China  
  
 Two decades ago China’s collective action remained predominantly a national 
issue; foreign media was unaware of the degree to which collective action had begun to 
plague the country. However, this foreign naivety is no longer the case. For example, 
the Financial Times of London, a popular newspaper in both Europe and the United 
States, has been covering a significant portion of the news pertaining to China’s 
economic growth and, more specifically, indirectly highlighting protests that have 
occurred as a result of many diverse reasons. The extent to which foreign media covers 
and concentrates on the finer details of what is actually occurring in a given country can 
be an initial indication of how large-scale the problems have become in that specific 
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country. Many journalists and economists have focused on China’s GDP as a result of 
the country’s economic growth; however, an analysis of this economic growth has also 
highlighted an abundance of protests spanning across many of China’s regions.  
However, as the world now begins to focus more and more on China’s global economic 
advancements, people have finally begun to realize and see just how large scale China’s 
social discontent has become.  
One of the suspected factors lending a hand in this discontent, China’s creation 
of a market economy over the past three decades has been the focus of extensive 
scholarly research. The very rapid increase of collective actions, such as strikes and 
protests, has been an important by-product of the creation of a labor market in China, 
and has been an acute area of concern among Chinese government officials. The 
CHAM-Honda protest illustrates this by-product. In 1992, China, with the cooperation 
of Dongfeng Motor Corp (China’s state-owned motor company) began working with 
Japanese suppliers to help propel and increase production within the CHAM-Honda 
sector. More specifically, this meant that China had begun outsourcing many of its 
products from Japan thus establishing one of the first Sino-foreign joint enterprises in 
China. With the creation of this specific Sino-foreign joint enterprise in China (creating 
a labor market in the auto industry sector), one serious repercussion has been a growth 
in protests among those employees working in these sectors.  
C.K. Lee, Kevin O’Brien, William Hurst, and Elizabeth Perry are just a few 
scholars that have examined the link between the creation of labor markets and 
collective action. Because China is an expansive country with many, diverse regions, it 
has been quite common for scholars to analyze collective action through a “regional” 
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lens. Many of these scholars argue that market reform has been the underlying catalyst 
in collective action. While useful, this paper goes even further by disaggregating 
Chinese collective action along two dimensions: by sub-region and by occupation. More 
specifically, this research disaggregates large macro-regions to show diversity at the 
city-level within regions. For instance, the CHAM-Honda strike provides a great 
example of this disaggregated approach. I first researched collective action within the 
region of Guangdong, but then went a step further by investigating urban areas such as 
Foshan, Shishan, and Guangzhou in order to highlight specific cases such as Huang’s. 
As previously mentioned, analyzing a strike through a regional scope has been a 
common method used by scholars; however, China’s regions are extremely large and 
densely populated. For example, Guangdong, a region this paper frequently refers to, 
has a population exceeding 100 million people. When dealing with a region like 
Guangdong, whose population is so great and varied, taking a regional approach does 
not provide a sufficiently comprehensive or thorough analysis – it remains too broad of 
an approach. One simple explanation does not exist which covers all the details behind 
the protesting going on in a given region. C.K. Lee’s scholarship retains its accuracy in 
stating that workers in Guangdong have been suffering from pension issues, but that 
does not sufficiently explain all the discontent being felt by the workforce; many issues 
besides pension payments have been the catalysts for the unrest being suffered by 
workers in Guangdong.  
Taking a microscopic look within a region is an important and new perspective I 
have used to analyze strikes because it highlights the diversity and specificity within 
these strikes that would be undermined if one were simply looking macroscopically at a 
	  	   10	  
region. For example, when the CHAM-Honda incident was first analyzed, the 
conclusion was that CHAM workers were discontent because they were not receiving 
adequate pension payments. When we looked specifically at Huang’s case, it became 
clear that pension payment was not the underlying reason for protest; in fact, low wages 
happened to be the source of discontent. When we examine this case at greater length, it 
becomes apparent that the CHAM-Honda factory was doing everything it could to keep 
workers’ wages low, and one method they used was to hire “interns.”  
 In addition to considering micro regions, my new research also disaggregates 
collective action across occupations and industries, such as transportation workers and 
factory workers in the auto parts (like Huang), electronics and textiles industries. Most 
scholars have ignored the method of examining a protest by its industrial sector. When 
analyzing a protest by its sector, information becomes incredibly difficult to organize, 
especially when dealing with a subject like collective action. However, despite the 
difficulties, analyzing by sector can be important because it also highlights the diversity 
of these protests. More specifically, the fourth chapter will illustrate three cases within 
three separate regions that display economic prosperity. When we take a look at the 
electronics sector, we find that certain characteristics may explain why protests have 
been more prone to occur within this sector as opposed to others. First, the electronics 
sector has been characterized in China by a propensity to operate under Sino-foreign 
joint owned enterprises. Second, the electronics industry itself remains one of the 
largest in the world, as it does within China’s borders. And third, most electronics 
factories operate on incredibly time-sensitive schedules. These three characteristics of 
the Chinese electronics industry will be explored further in the fourth chapter of this 
	  	   11	  
paper. In addition to these sectoral trends, another dynamic of its protesting issue 
becomes uncovered when we begin to understand the subjective viewpoint of the 
protesters themselves. Hurst remains objective when analyzing collective action within 
economically flourishing areas, and he retains legitimacy in his argument by stating the 
importance of considering a region’s political economy when examining protests. 
However, by staying objective, his argument fails to consider the reality that individual 
workers have been perceptive to the successes of their region(s), companies, and peers, 
as well. Furthermore, it also sheds light on another important contribution of this paper 
– the implementation of laws and policies that have come to rise with the market 
reform. I will further explain the importance of these two contributions later in this 
chapter. To illustrate this disaggregated approach for examining collective action, I have 
constructed my own searchable database, which consists of 94 current, individual cases 
of collective action in China, each one of which has been verified. These cases have 
demonstrated how the targets for collective action, as well as the reasons for collective 
action among China’s regions are far less unified than scholars have projected. In 
disaggregating collective action within many of China’s vast regions, as well as 
occupational groups, I have created a new framework with which to analyze China’s 
collective action.  
 Before reviewing the literature presented by the above-mentioned scholars, I 
would like to introduce my database, in order to begin to establish some sense of 
organization for this topic. The next subsection briefly introduces the database, as well 
as the variables I used to organize and keep track of current protests.  
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II. The Importance of Collecting Data 
 In order to collect sufficient data on a topic as extensive as collective action, 
especially in China, it is necessary to make an unyielding effort to ensure that the 
sources one gathers sources are reliable and valid. The majority of my database is 
compiled of summary-like versions of newspaper articles from two online sites called 
China Labor Bulletin (CLB) and China Strikes.9 Both of these sites frequently have 
reliable and updated reports pertaining to the current issue of protests in China and do 
an exceptional job posting, blogging, and illustrating these incidents in detail. One 
factor to consider before I explain how I organized this database is determining the 
reliability of an article. There are millions of articles out there, especially pertaining to 
China’s collective action. While many of them are truthful, there are articles that have 
been published online that are not fully accurate or have been edited by a worker to 
distort specific details of an incident. I had made it a priority to ensure that all of the 
articles in my database are valid and if information seemed biased or untruthful, I did 
not use the article.  
 In addition to utilizing these online sites, I have also been tracking current 
incident of Chinese protests through international and national publications such as the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  9	  The China Labor Bulletin (CLB) is a non-governmental research organization created in 1994 by Han 
Dongfang. This organizations main goal is to defend and promote workers rights in China. The bulletin 
has updates and exceptional articles on current protests occurring in China. Most importantly the articles 
are valid and accurate. China Strikes is a site that maps labor unrest across China. This site differs from 
CLB in that it offers an actual map of China and pinpoints strikes occurring in a region selected by the 
viewer. The viewer can also pick and industrial sector and trace protests within that specific sector. More 
specifically, if the viewer decides they want to view the amount of strikes occurring in Shanghai within 
the taxi industry, this site allows you to choose a region and then select a sector. Both of these sites have 
contributed significantly to my database. I found China Strikes very helpful in illustrating trends within 
micro-regions, in addition to trends occurring within different industrial sectors. This site contains articles 
written in both Chinese and English. I attempted to translate as many Chinese articles I could, and 
although I was not able to translate every one, I have incorporated all of the English articles from China 
Strikes into my database. 	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Wall Street Journal, New York Times, local newspapers in Shanghai, China Daily, and 
the London Financial Times. Large newspapers such as these maintain a sufficient level 
of accuracy and have covered a significant number of incidents, especially over the past 
two years. The London Financial Times has done a particularly noteworthy job in 
highlighting specific incidents of collective action. In fact, the British news publication 
now has a “China Daily” section that has been translated for those Americans and 
Europeans who are interested in learning more about China. I have found many articles 
relating to China’s current unrest in the “China Daily” section of the London Financial 
Times.  
 All of the articles comprising my database have been taken from the above-
mentioned newspapers, CLB or China Strikes. I decided to do this because CLB is a 
well-known organization in China. CLB has offices in both the United States and Hong 
Kong, so the information posted to their site is accurate because the articles are in fact 
coming straight from Chinese newspapers. Hong Kong also lies in close proximity to 
Guangdong and this specific region has suffered a significant number of protests and 
demonstrations. In other words, as a close neighbor of such a highly volatile region, 
Hong Kong is prone to hearing current outbreaks. CLB also always posts a hyperlink to 
the newspaper article that the incident has been taken from, whether it is an 
international paper or a national one. China Strikes differs from CLB in that the site 
posts both “verified” and “unverified” instances of collective action. I personally like 
this method because it makes it easy for the viewer to read those articles that have been 
verified. A verified article has a hyperlink leading back to the original newspaper that 
had covered the incident. For example, when viewing a verified case, at the end of an 
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article, the viewer can find a hyperlink that leads back to all of the sources the article 
had been covered by. In many cases, CLB is a hyperlink. Therefore, the viewer can click 
the CLB hyperlink and be led directly to the date of the article, and from that site the 
viewer can then view the actual newspaper that covered the incident. This ability to 
trace articles back to their origins allowed me to determine whether or not an article was 
“valid,” and only after making this (affirmative) determination did I add any given 
specific incident into my database. Tracing articles can be hard, but as long as the 
incident came from a known newspaper I felt comfortable adding the article to my 
database. I did not read “unverified” cases.  
 I will now explain how I compiled the data taken from these newspaper articles 
and organized the information in a way that was comprehensible to not only me, but 
also to other readers interested in reading different incidents. First, the database was 
created from a Microsoft Excel spreadsheet. Upon reading an article involving a 
particular incident of collective action, I deemed that the title of the article, region, city 
within the region, industrial sector, number of workers involved, date of incident, date 
of publication, and resolution (if there was one) were among the most important factors 
to consider. In organizing my incident articles in this fashion, I enabled myself to 
choose a specific category (or categories) by which to analyze and interpret the data 
efficiently. Organizing the database in this way allowed me to quickly deduce trends, 
whether it was by micro-region, province, region, or industrial sector. More specifically, 
my database allowed me to interpret significant trends occurring in both areas in which 
this thesis contributes to this subject: micro-regional trends and industrial sector trends. 
I learned from this database that instances of collective action have been far more 
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complex and diverse than scholars have been portraying them to be, and in many cases 
the protests have not been occurring because of the newly establish market reform 
policies that C.K. Lee brings to light, but because of the lackadaisical implementation 
by local leaders, managers, and governmental officials. Now that we have a basic 
understanding of my database, I would like to introduce the main contributions of this 
thesis in light of a few scholars who have done extensive research concerning China’s 
collective action.  
 
III. Understanding Both the Positives and Negatives of Regional Analysis  
 Many are aware of the increased number of protests occurring throughout China, 
but few people have a clear idea when it comes to discerning the motivating factors 
surrounding these protests. As stated previously, many scholars have taken a regional 
approach to study these factors. However, analyzing these protests by region is too 
broad of a strategy for such a study.  For example, for her main argument C.K. Lee 
looks at two specific regions, Liaoning and Guangdong, and analyzes them in light of 
the 1980s market reforms. This method is helpful because it illustrates that these 
protests are not strictly confined to one area of China, but rather in two vastly different 
regions. It also allows the reader to see that the reason for protest varies greatly across 
different regions. Workers in Liaoning are distraught because of low wages (or in some 
cases lack of wages), while workers in Guangdong cite an inability to receive their 
pensions as the main reason for discontent. The second chapter of this thesis will take a 
greater look at these reforms; however, what is important to understand is that both of 
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these issues – wage and pension payments – were altered in the market reform era and 
as a result have become major sources of discontent.  
William Hurst, like C.K. Lee, also takes a regional approach to analyze 
discontent; however, his main argument states that the reader must take into 
consideration a region’s political economy, or its economic stability, to understand 
discontent among workers. In other words, if a region were doing poorly from an 
economic standpoint, then that would be considered the primary source of its workers’ 
discontent. The vigor of the labor market has had a particularly significant effect on 
citizens residing within their respective regions. With jobs being more difficult to find 
in some areas than in others, workers have become discontent with more frequency than 
before, and as a result they have become prone to acting on their feelings through 
engaging in protests and strikes. This method is helpful because it allows the reader to 
become familiar with how well China is doing economically, as well as what areas are 
flourishing more than others. However, it is not the most accurate method because a 
region’s GDP does not reflect how well workers are actually doing. For example: 
Shanghai’s GDP is one of the highest in China, but workers in the region of Shanghai 
are protesting regardless of how well it is doing economically.  
While this thesis will also make a regional argument, its primary intention 
remains adding to both C.K. Lee and William Hurst by affording the reader a closer, 
more in-depth and specific look at the regions in question. By looking at the provincial 
and city levels, it becomes apparent that these protests have been relatively unique case 
by case and both C.K. Lee and Hurst’s broad explanations fail to explain the entirety of 
a given region’s discontent. In addition, this thesis will consider different occupational 
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sectors. I will note here that this has been an aspect of protests that has largely been 
ignored by analyses and studies, but it nevertheless remains an important dimension to 
take into consideration because one could make the logical assumption that different 
sectors might protest for different reasons. For example, we might consider the taxi 
sector: an incredibly small, complicated, and decentralized occupational sector within 
China. In the city of Pudong, Shanghai alone, more than 15 different taxi companies 
exist simultaneously. We cannot assume that they all protest for the exact same 
reason(s). I have chosen to highlight this particular aspect of protesting because we 
cannot look at a region as large as Guangdong and reasonably assume that all drivers in 
the taxi sector have been protesting purely against missing pension payments. In 
addition to this point, taxi drivers also behave differently than factory workers; workers 
across these two sectors do not protest using the same methods as each other. This latter 
point become a crucial one to consider because it illustrates how both separate 
workforces have utilized different strategies to succeed in protesting to have their 
demands met. We will explore this point further, in the fourth chapter, when we 
consider the vast electronics sector within China.  
 The next chapter of this paper will focus on protesting in light of the many 
reforms that are now taking place in present-day China. When analyzing a few of 
China’s newly created policies, it becomes evident that the policies which may be of 
paramount importance to urban (state-sector) workers, such as social security pensions, 
may not have as great an impact on the lives of those working in more rural areas. 
Alternatively, the policies that may be of importance to rural and migrant workers, such 
as medical care and land rights, may not be of importance or a high priority to urban 
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workers. After highlighting this factor, I will add that this paper is not about comparing 
and contrasting urban and rural China, but it utilizes research from a scholar who does 
some contrasting in order to highlight the diversity in various protests. More 
specifically, C.K. Lee analyzes two regions in China: Liaoning “the rustbelt” and 
Guangdong “the sunbelt.” Her research emphasizes many significant factors to the 
gradual uprising of collective action in China, but her main message is concerned with 
the ways in which China’s market reform era has impacted both urban and rural areas of 
China and the discontent that has followed a result of market reform and the various 
policies. Although C.K. Lee’s insight is helpful in highlighting the broader, more 
comprehensive reasoning behind protesting, she is at times too broad and abstract when 
it comes to the reasoning behind social discontent. My research aims to illustrate how 
China may be a much more diverse country than C.K. Lee portrays it to be. My own 
regional analysis of Guangdong will add to Lee’s by delving deeper, taking a micro-
regional approach that highlights the specificity of protesting on a case-by-case basis, 
and truly shows how diverse they have become in nature. This contribution will be 
explored further in the third chapter. 
 Different scholars utilize different frameworks to analyze the emergence of 
collective action. More specifically, scholars frame protest within specific categories in 
order to better understand motives behind the incidents. William Hurst in particular 
appreciates this approach because he feels that different frameworks may help explain 
and make sense of events, especially pertaining to collective action.10 Hurst, like C.K. 
Lee, takes a regional approach when analyzing China’s collective action; however, in 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 Hurst, William. "Understanding Contentious Collective Action by Chinese Laid-Off Workers: The 
Importance of Regional Political Economy.” Studies in Comparative International Development. 39.2 
(2004): 99. 
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addition to analyzing market reform policies impact on various regions in China, Hurst 
also considers the political economy of a region in order to understand collective action. 
More specifically, Hurst’s approach considers the region’s political economy instead of 
its market reform policies, as C.K. Lee does. For example, if we look at a region like 
Shanghai, one would immediately see that the region has a completely different 
dynamic when it comes to protesting: 
 One laid-off fish warehouse worker in Shanghai stressed that even things have 
 been more stable in the past, her family has acquired a television, refrigeration, 
 and air conditioner between 1992 and 2002, unthinkable luxuries in the 1970s. 
 She criticized the manager of her old state owned enterprise harshly and 
 complained about local officials (while admitting that most things are still 
 better in Shanghai than elsewhere) but also said protesting would not be worth 
 it and that her troublers were probably unique to her enterprise. A laid-off 
 sanitation worker and a laid- off chemical worker in Shanghai expressed 
 similar views. 11 
 
The first factor to highlight in Hurst’s argument is the region in question, Shanghai. The 
second is the region’s political economy. From this example, it would seem that this 
specific household is not doing as poorly as it could be doing; the evidence lies in the 
luxuries the household has been able to acquire during a decade time span. This specific 
worker also admits that, in particular, standards are better in Shanghai in comparison to 
other regions in China and that protesting would not be beneficial. This is an important 
point to highlight because in a region like Shanghai, there are so many different 
opportunities for an individual to find work. For example, the laid off chemical worker 
was able to find new work as a taxi driver.12 Being fired is not the end of the world, and 
although this specific worker was upset, it is likely safe to assume that she was able to 
find work elsewhere. However, in a region like Liaoning, the political economy is 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  11	  O'Brien, Kevin. Popular Protest in China. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2008. 75. 12	  O'Brien, Kevin. Popular Protest in China. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2008. 76. 
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vastly different, jobs are not as easily found, as “a team of government researchers in 
Liaoning Province found that 1,739,000 laid-off workers there who had not been able to 
find any form of gainful reemployment by the end of 2004, nearly 25% (21,000 had 
given up searching for work altogether, even in the absence of regular welfare 
subsidies”.13  
Hurst’s next step is to consider the plight of workers in a region like Liaoning 
and compare them to Shanghai workers: 
 Things could hardly be more different for Shanghai workers. A laid-off 
 worker from a state-owned wholesale and warehousing company there 
 complained bitterly about a lack of management accountability and blamed his 
 plight squarely on managers’ corrupting and incompetence. Still, though, he 
 was confident in that he could find a new job soon and did not seem worried 
 when pressed about what he would do if he could not.14 
 
The difference between Liaoning’s and Shanghai’s political economy is immense, and 
noteworthy of highlighting when considering collective action. While Shanghai is a 
region of prosperity and opportunity, Liaoning remains an area where opportunity is not 
as great, and protests may result directly from this lack of opportunity. Hurst adds to 
C.K. Lee’s argument in highlight the importance of political economy; however, Hurst 
and C.K. Lee alike remain too broad in their arguments. I agree with Hurst’s point that 
regional political economy is important to consider, but Shanghai is a large region with 
many districts and cities, and although Shanghai’s overall GDP is booming, not all 
workers are reflective of that. My research contributes to Hurst’s argument by showing 
that, even within regions and cities that display economic prosperity, many industries 
and occupational sectors still continue to suffer and protest as a result of discontent. My 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  13	  O'Brien, Kevin. Popular Protest in China. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2008. 81. 14	  O'Brien, Kevin. Popular Protest in China. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2008. 83. 	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contributions to Hurt’s argument will be explored later on in the fourth chapter of this 
thesis. 
 In the next chapter, China’s historical past will be explored and the contention as 
a result of this transition will be illustrated; however, now it is important to focus on the 
different frameworks and what frameworks have been most widely used. Of the 
frameworks mentioned above, scholars have largely analyzed the rise of collective 
action through China’s transition from a planned economy to a more market based 
economy. C.K. Lee, William Hurst, Kevin O’Brien, and Elizabeth Perry all frame 
China’s collective action in terms of the region and the emergence of market reform. 
However, while all of the abovementioned authors analyze market reform as a result of 
collective action, some scholars highlight different points to consider which do not 
directly deal with market reform. Hurst’s framework begins with a region’s political 
economy and then analyzes the emergence of collective action. While this approach is 
more specific and allows the reader to view the link between political economy and 
collective action, he also places a lot of focus on market reform, especially when he 
analyses the region of Liaoning. C.K. Lee, like Hurst, also analyzes China’s regions; 
however. She utilizes China’s market reform as a framework. This broader approach 
creates some organization to this chaotic topic; she misses a lot of the finer details 
pertaining to social discontent. While C.K. Lee and William Hurst’s different 
frameworks add considerable insight to the topic of collective action, my research offers 
additional contributions to both these scholars’ arguments pertaining to the underlying 
motives of Chinese collective action. I not only search within a specific region, but I 
also consider the city levels within that region to highlight the more concrete underlying 
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issues behind social discontent. In Hurst’s eyes, he would likely claim that I am creating 
two new frameworks to analyze the emergence of collective action, one which looks to 
a worker’s occupation and one which explores further within the city of contention. In 
other words, I use the city level as well as occupational sectors to frame and 
comprehend China’s collective action. In conclusion, most scholars frame collective 
action in light of China’s vast market reform. While market reform does remain one of 
the underlying reasons for discontent, it does not represent the only reason migrant and 
state-sector workers are protesting. Other scholars argue that market reform has had a 
positive effect on the Chinese labor population; however, there still exists a wide range 
of social discontent regarding how well new reform policies have been implemented.15 
 
IV. Reforms vs. Implementation 
 Apart from micro-regions and sectors another contribution of this thesis 
concerns the overlooked role of implementation of market reform policies. Although all 
of the above mentioned scholars have a different way of proving their points, they do 
manage to agree on one thing: the new reform agenda has brought about considerable 
discontent Chinese among urban and rural workers. C.K. Lee does an exceptional job 
explaining the new reform policies; however, C.K. Lee can sometimes be too broad 
when generalizing where collective action is taking place, and within her generalization 
of a region she can undermine the other cities within that region where protests are 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 Jamie Horsley is a scholar who focuses on China’s legal system. In exploring China’s vast legality 
system, Jamie highlights one of the country’s main issues when in comes to the rule of law and that is 
how well China’s government enforces its laws. Fewsmith, Joesph, ed. China Today, China Tomorrow: 
domestic politics, economy, and society. Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers Inc., 2010, 51-70.  
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taking place. In fact, my additional research has shown at the city level that many cities 
within a region protest for many different issues, especially in Guangdong. In addition, 
her conclusions are at times too neatly (and conveniently) organized. More specifically, 
the protests occurring in China, as you will see from my research, have been vast and 
incredibly diverse.  
 I agree that market reform has caused a considerable amount of discontent 
among many of China’s urban and rural workers; however, I also believe that these new 
reform policies have allowed China to be a prominent player in the globalized, capitalist 
world that we currently live in. I feel that C.K. Lee, while her argument and research 
may be significant to this field, overemphasizes the impact of market reform on Chinese 
workers and underemphasizes the impact of the implementation of these newly created 
policies. I would switch the order of emphasis here and also add that these newly 
created policies have been incredibly beneficial to Chinese workers. Market reform has 
had many positive impacts on China’s economy; however, it is ultimately the 
responsibility of managers and local government officials to implement these newly 
created policies. If policy implementation does not take place, it should come as no 
surprise that workers turn their backs on market reform. In summary, with any form of 
transformation, especially to social policies, consequence is inevitable. As long as there 
is history, people will always resort to the ways things were. And if times happened to 
be better than they are in the present, discontent will likely result. This fact would allow 
me to understand this point, but Elizabeth Perry has also illustrated that even during the 
“good times” China has suffered social discontent.   
	  	   24	  
 Although C. K. Lee creates some organization to the chaos of this collective 
action, it does not always offer a realistic or comprehensive explanation of what is 
actually going on in China. Hurst, on the other hand, brings forth an alternate 
framework within which to understand Chinese protest through the lens of a region’s 
political economy and the opportunities that are available within that specific economy. 
Opportunity should be a crucial point to consider because it has been through the new 
market reforms that this sense of “opportunity” has been allowed to emerge. One can 
also see opportunity as a leading motivation to strike. If there is a chance that workers’ 
livelihoods may be improved, or that a better opportunity might present itself, then 
workers should and will fight for that chance to obtain these opportunities. In the post-
reform era, opportunity was non-existent – each worker had the same opportunities as 
the next. Elizabeth Perry allows us to turn to China’s history to understand this fact in 
addition to giving us a basic understanding of what the pre-reform era was like. In 
summary, it is important to take into consideration this Maoist nostalgic framework of 
because this legacy of pre-reform era has significantly influenced the grievances of laid-
off workers.  
 In the second half of this paper I will illustrate that collective action occurs not 
necessarily because of the newly created market reform policies, but more notably 
because of how well these policies are implemented. My research has shown that when 
one disaggregates collective action not by region, but by city and occupation, it is not 
the market reform agenda that is causing this widespread discontent, but the 
implementation of this agenda. Workers are not necessarily upset with the policies that 
are created, because in actuality, these policies would prove to be quite beneficial for 
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their livelihoods. Contention arises because of the unwillingness of local authorities, 
managers, and governments to effectively enforce the laws that come with the new 
reform agenda. C.K. Lee, O’Brien, Hurst, Perry, and Caroline Hsu’s focus on market 
reform as the catalyst for discontent may be significant because the information they 
illustrate to their readers helps them understand not only the need for these reforms, but 
also some of the smaller gaps in the reform process, one among them being the 
implementation of policies. The only issue with the work done by these scholars is that 
they do not touch on these gaps, and some of these gaps are actually causing many of 
the problems, one huge issue being implementation.  
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Chapter Two:	  
A Glance At the Past 
 
In this chapter the reader will begin to gain a basic understanding of how 
Chinese workers typically lived prior to 1980, during the Maoist era. It is crucial to first 
gain this historical perspective in order to then be able to understand the contemporary 
social discontent among workers. The transition from a planned economy under the 
Maoist era to Deng’s open market economy has caused significant national discontent. 
The third section of this paper will introduce C.K. Lee’s Livelihood Struggles and 
Market Reform, where the reader will gain a basic understanding of some of the more 
contemporary reform policies that have brought forth widespread dissatisfaction among 
both migrant and state-sector workers. Literature written by Kevin O’Brien, Elizabeth 
Perry, and William Hurst will also be used as tools to further analyze the link between 
market reform and collective action. The fourth section of this chapter will shed light 
upon the open promises of specific reform policies, such as labor contracts, the 1994 
and 2008 Labor Laws, pensions, and unpaid wages. C.K. Lee offers significant insight 
on two regions in China, Liaoning located in northern China and Guangdong, located in 
southern China.  C.K. Lee’s regional analysis of these two specific regions will serve as 
a tool for both illustrating the specific social discontent in two vast regions in China 
while also helping me to introduce my point of view pertaining to the advantages and 
disadvantages of regional analysis. The final section of this chapter will reveal my own 
personal insights into the current protesting and will introduce my framework for 
analyzing collective action in contemporary China. In the present day, the rest of the 
world has continued to become increasingly aware of China’s social unrest; however, 
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the news which actually airs to the public remains very selective. As soon as more 
protests begin to find their way to different media outlets, foreign countries will surely 
begin to question the manner in which China treats its people. China has set itself along 
the right path, steering farther away from socialist values and entering a world of 
commerce, international relations, and market reform; however, a country cannot 
progress without the support of its people. If China loses the support of its citizens, it 
seems very likely that China will have difficulty progressing further either politically or 
socially, but more importantly economically, as well. 
It is necessary to turn one’s gaze to both the Maoist era and the Deng era in 
order to understand the motives behind the present-day reform policies, as well as the 
discontent that follows as a result. We will first look at the Maoist period and then turn 
our attention to Deng’s succession along with an analysis of his ideology of turning 
China into a capitalist economy. This socialist-capitalist transition is significant in that 
it allows many to understand the beginning source of social discontent in China.  
 
 
I. The Communist Party’s Socialist Footprint 
 
One facet of Mao’s political institutionalism was his vision of a planned 
economy.16 Within this socialist planned economy, Mao Zedong created two significant 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 Under a planned economy social production is aimed at meeting the ever increasing needs of the entire 
society in the interest of all the working people, instead of catering to the private interests of the few. 
Under a unified state plan, it can distribute the labor force and the means of production among the various 
departments in the national economy so as to use manpower, material and financial resources rationally in 
the light of the needs of the state and the people and the proportional relations which exist objectively 
between the various departments. In this way, the entire national economy can develop in a planned and 
proportionate way and at a high speed. Ching-wen, Wu. "Socialist Planned Economy." Peking Review. 
16.11 (1973): 7-8. Web. 9 Dec. 2011. <http://www.marxists.org/subject/china/peking-review/index.htm>. 
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institutions: the “danwei”17 and the “iron rice bowl.”18 Both the danwei and the iron rice 
bowl guaranteed lifetime employment; however, Mao’s vision went further than this. 
Elizabeth Perry describes the concept of the Chinese danwei as an institution that had 
multiple social, political, and economic functions, and as a permanent ‘membership’ of 
workers with lifetime employment.19 Workers assigned to a danwei remained in their 
work units for the duration of their lives. The danwei guaranteed security and protection 
from job termination. Once assigned to a specific danwei, a worker could rest assured 
that he or she was guaranteed that job for the rest of his or her life. The “iron rice bowl” 
promised workers lifetime employment, housing, health care, pension plans, and 
education for their children. In addition to creating institutions such as the danwei, Mao 
also did a significant amount of restructuring to ensure the longevity of socialism. One 
aspect of China’s economy that Mao restructured during his reign was the existence of 
private enterprises. Elizabeth explains Mao’s alteration exceptionally, 
Private firms were eliminated and replaced by so-called joint ownership 
 enterprises. Under this arrangement, the former owners became state 
 employees, receiving interest on the value of their shares in the enterprise. The 
 capitalist no longer enjoyed profits, nor did they exercise any real managerial 
 initiative…the joint-owned companies were in effect wholly state-run 
 entities.20 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 Under the socialist planned economy, workers belonged to a work unit called the danwei. The danwei 
was a source of identification. When a worker asked another worker where they were from, a typical 
response was something along the lines of “Watch Factory Number 18”. “Number 18” is the regional 
location, work unit of that worker. Xiaobu, Lu, and Elizabeth Perry, ed. Danwei: The Changing Chinese 
Workplace in Historical and Comparative Perspective. Armonk: M.E. Sharpe, Inc., 1997, 42.  
18 The idea behind the “iron rice bowl” is that a worker will always have rice in their iron bowl. The 
notion that the bowl was made of steel meant that the bowl would never break. In other words, workers 
would always have a stable source of food. The iron rice bowl was a planned economy slogan that 
assured workers of a lifetime of food and employment.  
19	  Xiaobu, Lu, and Elizabeth Perry, ed. Danwei: The Changing Chinese Workplace in Historical and 
Comparative Perspective. Armonk: M.E. Sharpe, Inc., 1997, 42-53. 
20 Perry, Elizabeth. "Shanghai's Strike Wave of 1957." China Quarterly. 137 (1994): 7.  
	  	   29	  
In other words, if private enterprises exist while new state laws are being implemented, 
these private enterprises can create their own rules and laws, and they may choose not 
to abide by state and national laws. New market reform policies may not necessarily 
apply to these private enterprises, and if workers feel that their enterprise is not abiding 
by national laws, collective action may be the result. This particular conclusion 
becomes relevant when considering the CHAM-Honda example explored in the first 
chapter. Due to CHAM-Honda being a private Sino-foreign joint enterprise, the 
company was allowed to get away with things that state-owned enterprises would not 
have been allowed to. The mere existence of private enterprises goes against any 
socialist ideology because private enterprises are there to gain for themselves. A private 
enterprise’s’ profits goes into its company and is not shared with the greater state as a 
whole, which ran contrary to what Mao wanted under his planned economy. However, 
even this alteration caused discontent among workers. 
 
a. China’s Contentious Past  
Many believe that the contemporary instances of collective action are a novelty 
to China; however, it is important to note that the Maoist era was not an era untouched 
by social turmoil. During this time period China was also plagued with social discontent 
among its citizens. In fact, Elizabeth Perry highlights some of the demonstrations during 
the 1950s, saying that “in March 1957, Party Central, acknowledging that labor strikes, 
student boycotts and mass petitions and demonstrations had increased dramatically in 
the past half year, Party central estimated that more than 10,000 strikes had erupted 
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across the country during this period”.21 More importantly to note about this fact is not 
so much the early acts of Chinese protesting, but the way in which Mao utilized 
protesting to further advance himself politically. Elizabeth Perry illustrates how Mao 
used popular uprising to his advantage, explaining that “Mao hoped that the release of 
social tensions in China would avert popular uprising at home…Mao was clearly 
anxious to defuse domestic contradictions. Mao refereed the hope that strikes in China 
might help forestall a large and more serious insurgency at home [China]”.22 In other 
words, Mao believed that strikes were healthy simply because they could prevent a 
larger revolt.23 Mao used the masses to propel his political authority and advance his 
stay in office. The combination of Mao creating and restructuring institutions allowed 
him to maintain socialist notions under a planned economy. Those living under this 
socialist state became secure. However, after Mao Zedong died in 1979, Mao’s 
successor Deng Xiaoping,24 along with other reformers, broke down both notions of the 
“danwei” and the “iron rice bowl,” along with Mao’s elimination of private enterprises, 
in order to move China in a more capitalist direction. Although this capitalist direction 
may be a circumstantial factor, it is a hypothetical cause that many scholars argue may 
be the reason behind the ever-present social discontent today.  
  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21 Perry, Elizabeth. "Shanghai's Strike Wave of 1957." China Quarterly. 137 (1994): 5. 
22 Perry, Elizabeth. "Shanghai's Strike Wave of 1957." China Quarterly. 137 (1994): 7.  
23 This is an important concept to consider in light of the current protesting today. How healthy are 
strikes, and at what point do too many strikes become unhealthy?  
24 Deng Xiaoping became the most powerful leader in the People's Republic of China (PRC) following 
Mao Zedong’s death in 1979. He served as the chairman of the Communist Party's Military Commission 
and was the chief architect of China's economic improvements during the 1980s. Mao and Deng parted 
ways in the 1960s as they disagreed over the strategy of economic development and other policies. Mao 
wanted to stay on the path of socialism and Deng wanted to move in the direction of opening China’s 
doors to foreign investment and higher education. “Deng Xiaoping.” Encyclopedia Britannica. 
Encyclopedia Britannica Online, 2011. Web. June 2011. 
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II. The Market Model Under Deng Xiaoping’s Influence 
Deng Xiaoping’s ideology differed from Mao’s in that he believed capitalism 
would industrialize China as a whole; however, many employment regions in China 
were negatively affected by many of Deng’s bold reforms while Deng’s bold market 
reforms25 propelled the country’s economy forward.26 More specifically, Chinese 
workers residing in various regions were no longer protected from losing their jobs, 
breaking down both notions of the “iron rice bowl” and the “danwei.” Keith Schoppa 
explains that under the traditional system workers did not have to pay for medical care 
or put money into pension funds.27 Beginning in the 1990s workers had to do both, and 
they also had to worry about life insurance. However, under the reform workers had 
more choice in where they worked, which was one of the downfalls of the danwei 
system. Deng’s vision to move China in a more capitalist direction was a decision made 
to benefit China’s economy; however, many scholars argue that it was the breakdown of 
these traditionalist institutions that has contributed to the widespread discontent China 
currently faces. John Gittings touches on this contentious capitalist shift in his book, 
The Changing Face of China, when he explores the post-Mao transition. Gittings 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25 Although this paper will only touch on China’s urban market reforms, China’s agricultural sector also 
underwent serious reform that affected those living in rural China. Smith, Christopher. China in the 
Post-Utopian Age. Boulder: Westview Press, 2000, 119-180.  
26 Of these reforms, Keith Schoppa notes that one of the reform efforts was to move towards 
privatization. Once enterprises went private, they would be driven by the bottom line- profits. Without the 
danwei system, many workers were in danger of losing their jobs. Another impact of privatization was 
ideological. In socialism the state owns and controls industry. Once companies became private and 
worked for individual company profits, there was no way the new Chinese system could remain socialist. 
The official party-state line became “socialism with Chinese characteristics,” clearly a euphemism for 
capitalism. Keith, Schoppa. Twentieth Century China: A History in Documents. 2nd. New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2010, 153.  
27 Keith, Schoppa. Twentieth Century China: A History in Documents. 2nd. New York: Oxford University 
Press, 2010, 153.  
	  	   32	  
enables the reader to understand Deng Xiaoping’s logic in making this capitalist 
transition amongst the contention that it would cause,  
The more party members and other people there are who use their heads and 
 thing things through, the more our cause will benefit. To make revolution and 
 build socialism we need large numbers of path breakers who dare to think, 
 explore new ways, and generate new ideas. Otherwise we wont be able to rid 
 our country of poverty and backwardness or to catch up with-till less surpass0 
 the advanced countries. We hope every party committee and every party 
 branch will encourage and support people both inside and outside the party to 
 dare to think, explore new paths, and put forward new ideas, and that they will 
 urge the masses to emancipate their minds and use their heads (13, December 
 1978).28 
 
In highlighting Deng Xiaoping’s mentality, it is apparent that Deng believed that these 
new ideas would steer China in the direction it needed to be going in – a more 
innovative and capitalist direction – which would allow the country to compete with the 
other leading capitalist countries. Later on, Gittings states that it was this ideology that 
disturbed those who wished to cling to the old certainties of the Maoist planned 
economy.29 However, Deng did realize how important it was to reach out to the masses 
when creating these new reforms, “In the final analysis, all out other reforms depend on 
the success of the political reform, because it is human beings who will- or will not 
carry them out...”.30 However, as much emphasis as Deng placed on the human beings 
that would carry out these reforms, he did neglect them when he broke down prior 
traditionalist institutions. Although breaking down these traditionalist institutions 
brought a sense of insecurity to workers, Deng did try to install some sense of security 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28 Gittings, John. The Changing Face of China: From Mao to Market. New York: Oxford University 
Press, 2005, 168.  
29 Gittings, John. The Changing Face of China: From Mao to Market. New York: Oxford University 
Press, 2005, 168. 
30 Gittings, John. The Changing Face of China: From Mao to Market. New York: Oxford University 
Press, 2005, 179. 
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for worker. In order to do so, labor contracts and national labor laws were created to 
improve Mao’s old socialist traditions.  
After the Maoist era, new labor policies were created to restructure prior 
socialist traditions, as C.K. Lee discusses, 
Firstly, the unmaking of an entire generation of workers rooted in Maoist 
socialist tradition and institutions; and secondly, the making of a new young 
generation of migrant workers who are inserted into the orbit of capitalism 
without being fully proletarianized or deprived of their land rights.31 
 
In other words, C.K. Lee hints that collective action has become so prevalent now 
because those workers who lived in the generation of Mao were used to his institutions, 
therefore they were more apt to fight to try to get back the rights they once had. With a 
new generation being born into a world of capitalism, the new generation can mold to 
the new policies without being proletarianized the way the past generations had been. 
C.K. Lee illustrates that two of the socialist traditions which the new labor reform 
sought to break down were both the notion of the ‘danwei’ and that of the ‘iron rice 
bowl’. Tim Pringle also illustrates this point, 
…One of the targets of the reforms has been to destroy 'old-fashioned' notions of 
secure employment and welfare and substitute them with labour markets and 
pay-as-you-earn social security insurance. In the eyes of the World Bank and 
various neo-liberal economists, one of the great achievements of the Deng era 
was to lay the groundwork for an economy that operated on the principles of the 
'trickledown' theory, as opposed to notions of the right to work and the right to 
basic welfare.32 
 
The destruction of these two socialist traditions has had an enormous impact on many 
urban Chinese citizens.33 Under Deng’s newly reconstructed system, Chinese citizens 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
31 Lee, Ching. Livelihood Struggles and Market Reform: (Un) making Chinese Labor After State 
Socialism. United Research Institute for Social Development, 2005, 5. 
32 Pringle, Tim. “A Labor Movement in the Making?” China Labor Bulletin (2002): Web. 16 May 2011.  
33  Lee, Ching. Livelihood Struggles and Market Reform: (Un) making Chinese Labor After State 
Socialism. United Research Institute for Social Development, 2005. 
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were no longer guaranteed lifetime employment, only foreshadowing a number of new 
reform policies that would forever alter their livelihood. More specifically, under Mao’s 
planned economy, workers had been guaranteed a sense of security that they were no 
longer assured of under a capitalist regime. It is nevertheless important to note that 
Deng’s reform policies were actually incredibly beneficial for the country; however, the 
change from strict socialism to private entrepreneurship created hurdles that many 
Chinese were not used to, such as corruption. More specifically, the policies were 
legitimate; however, those with authority who were supposed to be enforcing these laws 
were improperly implementing policies, especially those laws that were created to 
safeguard workers, thus causing a significant amount of widespread discontent. This 
implementation issue will be revisited when we look at some of the policies that were 
created under Deng’s regime later on in this chapter. 
 Now that we have a greater understanding of the socialist-capitalist transition 
China’s economy made during the 1980s, we can turn our attention to some of the 
market reform policies that have caused such widespread discontent. In this section 
there has been a brief introduction to some of the implementation issues that emerge as 
a result of market reform; however, the problems that appear as a result of the policies 
that were created during this time period are far more complex than the simple 
implementation of these policies. The next section will give a brief introduction of 
Chinese market reform. The following section will introduce some of the reform 
policies established during Deng’s reign that still exist today and have caused and 
continue to cause such widespread discontent among so many Chinese workers. We will 
then turn our attention to some of the scholars who have used the regional analysis 
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technique in order to illustrate the connection between market reform and collective 
action. Many scholars, such as C.K. Lee, William Hurst, Elizabeth Perry, and Kevin 
O’Brien believe that market reform has played a prominent role in fostering discontent 
among Chinese citizens. More specifically, we will turn our attention to two regions, 
Guangdong and Liaoning, where pension and unemployment have caused a 
considerable amount of discontent. This social unrest has arisen as a result of two 
policies that were originally created to ensure the livelihood of both urban and rural 
workers. It is important to note that market reform has become a considerable burden 
amongst many of China’s workers; however, the transition from a planned economy to 
a market based economy is not the only source of hardship.   
 
 
III. An Introduction to Chinese Market Reform 
 
 In C.K. Lee’s Livelihood Struggles and Market Reform, she elaborates on the 
many flaws in China’s market policy reforms which have taken a toll on the livelihoods 
of both migrant and state-sector workers and that, as a result, have caused social 
discontent: “protests notwithstanding, the Chinese government has ardently pressed 
ahead with social security reform, targeting problem areas such as pension, unpaid 
wages, unemployment benefits, and medical insurance”.34 In addition to shedding light 
on these flaws, C.K. Lee also explains the varying discrepancies in implementing many 
of these new reform policies. In other words, while many of the new policies seem 
promising in theory and show signs of potential benefit for workers, the implementation 
of these policies may lack authority and, as a result, the workers suffer,  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
34 Lee, Ching. Livelihood Struggles and Market Reform: (Un) making Chinese Labor After State 
Socialism. United Research Institute for Social Development, 2005, 2.  
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The central problem for Chinese workers is not the new labor and welfare 
system, but the wide discrepancies between the stipulation and the 
implementation of these new policies…the state uses the law as a means of 
controlling society, while allowing itself to remain mostly unrestrained by the 
law. When it is not in the interest of the local officials to enforce labor 
regulations, there is hardly enough countervailing authority to preserve the 
sanctity of the law.35 
 
It is important to note two things from this description. First, workers do not emerge 
worse off than before the laws were passed. With the creation of the new laws, a logical 
assumption would be that workers’ expectations would rise. Subsequently, if workers’ 
expectations failed to be met, the likely result would be discontent. On June 27th 2011, 
the China Labor Bulletin highlighted a protest by taxi drivers in Henan in response to 
the local government abolishing a long-established system of six workdays, one rest 
day. This meant that the city’s 10,607 licensed cabs had to work seven days a week in 
order to satisfy the government’s demands for more cabs on the street.36 Discontent 
arose because the taxi drivers working in Henan had certain expectations that were not 
met. The majority of these drivers worked long hours already, and the one rest day they 
had been afforded prior to the changes allowed them to relax and collect their energy for 
the days to come. Taxi drivers work six days a week and expect to have one off day. By 
eliminating their one day off, these drivers naturally became discontent and protests that 
occurred in response to their expectations not being met. Second, ‘the state’ and ‘local 
officials’ are two different concepts. The ‘state’ level pertains to the Chinese 
government as a whole, while ‘local officials’ pertains to local governments and the 
people who enforce the laws.  At the local government level, failure to enforce labor 
laws and policies poses a critical problem: which laws ought to be (actually) 	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Socialism. United Research Institute for Social Development, 2005, 2.  
36 See Appendix A Reports 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, and 26. For all sequential strikes see Appendix A.	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implemented and which ones ought not? The next section will go into greater detail on 
specific policies that replaced prior socialist traditions and discuss why new reforms 
policies have not met the expectations of urban and rural workers.  
 
 
IV. Out With the Old and In With the New: Reform 101 
 
One of the first policies created to ensure the dissolution of these two socialist 
traditions was the idea of employee labor contracts. Labor contracts were introduced in 
the late 1970’s for two reasons: “as a way of expanding employment, by allowing 
enterprise managers to recruit their own workers and create more employment channels 
run by collectives and private enterprises…a second reason was reform leadership’s 
decision to allow foreign investment in special economic zones in south China”.37 The 
labor contract was created to give workers the same sense of security guaranteed by the 
danwei and the “iron rice bowl,” but it differs in that a worker could be fired if he or she 
failed to do his or her job properly. The Chinese government viewed signing labor 
contracts as a plausible way to regulate the number of employees and also as a tool to 
attract more employees. The labor contract ensures agreement between employer and 
employee. However, C.K. Lee states that while the labor contracts were created in 1979, 
they were not put in effect until 1993. Grace Lee further explains the issue of labor 
contracts and the reason for discontent among workers. As a result of breaking “the iron 
rice bowl,” managers now have the ability to fire their workers more easily: 
The most important of these was the attempt to ‘break the iron rice-bowl’ of 
state workers by introducing the labor contract system. This reform aimed to 
increase the discretionary powers of managers over their workforce, in particular 
strengthening their ability to dismiss workers…the core principles of this reform 	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Socialism. United Research Institute for Social Development, 2005, 7.  
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were to introduce a labor contract system by which workers were employed on a 
contractual basis and no longer as ‘permanent’ employees with virtual lifetime 
guarantees.38 
 
On the one hand, the government broadens work options and tries to improve relations 
between employer and employee. On the other hand, for those guaranteed a permanent 
job during the Maoist era, this rule now no longer applies since managers can readily 
“fire” their employees without honoring the terms of the contract. More specifically, 
C.K. Lee illustrates the reality behind this labor contract in her other book, Against the 
Law: Labor Protests in China’s Rustbelt and Sunbelt,  
Official statistics show that labor contracts have become universal in the state 
sector by the end of the 1990s, although in many places, signing a contract is 
just a ritualistic compliance. Neither workers nor managers were serious or 
concerned about the terms and implication of the contracts. For the non-state 
sector, surveys reveal that only about 23-30 percent of migrant workers in 
private enterprises have contracts.39  
 
Switching to this contract system allows managers to more easily fire their workers. If 
contracts are not being signed, the regulations behind the layoff conditions also do not 
apply. For migrant workers living in the once industrially booming Liaoning province, 
being laid off has become a serious issue because those that become unemployed cannot 
find other jobs.  
It is important to note that in 2008, China’s Labor contract was revised and 
renamed the PRC Labor Contract Law. Edward Epstein, a managing partner at the 
Troutman Sanders40 law firm, illustrates the reality of the Labor Contract by stating, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
38 Linda, Wong, and Norman Flynn, ed. The Market in Chinese Social Policy. New York: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2001, 21. 
39 Lee, Ching. Against the Law: Labor Protests in China’s Rustbelt and Sunbelt. Ewing: University of 
California Press, 2007, 42.  
40 Troutman Sanders is a well-establish international law firm with offices all over the world. Edward 
Epstein, who is a member of the Troutman Sander’s firm located in Shanghai, helped draft and prepare 
China’s New Labor Contract for two years. The draft was finalized in 2007, ready to be put into action 
January 1st, 2008.  
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“…there is no question that the new law has changed many well-established rules and 
filled loopholes that have long been considered too favorable to employers”.41 The 
‘loopholes’ Epstein refers to have not diminished with the revision of the new 2008 
Labor Contract Law. In comparison to 1994, state-sector workers now sign these labor 
contracts more often; however, employers in the present day retain the power to alter 
the terms of the contract if they feel it will better the growth of the company.42 This 
altering of the labor contract violates the newly formed 2008 modifications, thus 
illustrating the ‘loopholes’ Epstein refers to.  
The National Labor Law of 1994 represents another policy reform that has had a 
significant impact on worker livelihood. The law was implemented to protect the legal 
rights of workers, set a minimum wage system, and also to “break the unequal power 
between employees and employers”.43 The Labor Law’s four main concerns were 
pensions, unemployment benefits, medical care, and housing. Under the Labor Law, 
workers were guaranteed a pension upon their retirement. If fired, workers would 
receive compensation to live off of until a new job could be found. Workers could also 
count on being provided basic medical attention when needed, in addition to private 
ownership of land. Of these four concerns, pension and unemployment benefits have 
since received the most attention from the media. 
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a. The Pension Problem 
One of the first policies created to provide workers with some form of security 
were pension payments. These differed from the previous idea behind the “danwei” 
because they did not guarantee lifetime employment, but they did offer a measure of 
security for those who had reached the end of their employment careers. Pensions were 
a part of market reform that in actuality should have benefited workers, but failure by 
the government to implement the policy led to the current discontent that we have been 
witnessing in China. The policy was sound, but when its implementation was left 
unfinished or unenforced, the result was and has continued to be workers’ discontent 
and the protesting that has become a growing problem throughout the country. 
C.K. Lee explains that “pensions were drawn from enterprises’ employee 
welfare funds, the size of which varied with the size of the enterprise and came from the 
government”.44 However, as straightforward as the pension fund appears, Bergsten and 
others emphasize that with the creation of the new market reform policies, the pension 
system, along with other systems, have been disrupted,45 
Reform, particularly in the last decade and a half, has severely disrupted this 
 system…starting in 1996, a new pension system was introduced which covers 
 all urban workers, not just those working for state companies. However, these 
 new delivery mechanisms have developed only unevenly, leaving many 
 unemployed Chinese beyond the reach of the emerging social safety net. 46 
 
It is important to note that the social safety net referred to here is a reference to the old 
traditionalist institutions discussed earlier in this chapter. The idea was to transform 
both notions of the danwei and iron rice bowl into a safety net that could continue to 
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prosper in a more capitalist China. In many cases, an enterprise would have a pooling 
pension system where a small percentage from an employee’s salary would be taken 
and put into a ‘pooled pension’ fund.47 C.K. Lee illustrates here that the Labor Law 
requires all enterprises, regardless of ownership category, and all employees, including 
migrant workers, to participate in this contributory system. However, the pension 
system has had its flaws, “the implementation of pension reform has met with serious 
problems…overall, across all types of enterprises, only 40% of firms participate in 
pension scheme. A survey on some 1,500 migrant workers in Guangdong found that 
73.8% of the respondent did not have any form of social security in 2001”.48 The 
establishment of the 1994 National Labor Law stated that enterprises were to participate 
in this pension scheme; pension reform was not intended to be voluntary. Today, those 
living in Guangdong still suffer from not being able to receive proper pension allotment. 
The China Labor News Translations (CLNT) provides great insight into how China’s 
social security system was failing for migrant workers, in particular when it came to 
obtaining retirement pensions,  
On 1 January 2010, new provisional regulations were enacted permitting the 
Inter-regional transfer of social security accounts (pension). In Guangdong, the 
new regulations were accompanied by a last minute announcement that, from 31 
December 2009, workers would no longer be allowed to cash-in their 
pensions…many workers did not hear the news and missed the deadline. Many 
turned to protest in an attempt to get their money.49 
 
This problem with inter-regional transfer proves a heavy burden for those migrant 
workers who want to switch locations. If migrants want to seek out an opportunity in a 	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different province, their contributions to the pension scheme in their current location 
will not transfer to the new scheme. In addition to Guangdong, Liaoning also suffers 
from unpaid pensions. Liaoning, a province located in the northeastern region of China, 
has a population presently standing at approximately 43.2 million (according to the 
Hong Kong Trade Development Council). Liaoning has enjoyed a long history of 
industrial development and had been a center for major industry and raw materials. 
However, Liaoning can no longer boast as the promising industrial province of old. 
C.K. Lee, in her book, Against the Law: Labor Protests in China’s Rustbelt and 
Sunbelt, describes the state of present-day Liaoning: “the rustbelt, Liaoning, once the 
heartland of the socialist planned economy and home to some of China’s most 
prominent state-owned industrial enterprises, Liaoning has decayed into a waste land of 
bankruptcy and a hotbed of working-class protest by its many unemployment workers 
and pensioners”.50 As a result of this vast transformation from a once industrially 
booming province into a wasteland, not only has Liaoning’s physical appearance 
disintegrated, but its population of state-sector workers has also significantly suffered,  
 In Liaoning province alone, between 2000 and 2002, more than 830,000 
 people were involved in 9,559 ‘mass incidents’, or an average of ten incidents 
 each involving ninety people everyday for nearly three years. Nationwide, the 
 Ministry of Public Security recorded 8,700 such incidents in 1993 rising to 
 11,000, 15,000, and 32,000 in 1995, 1997, and 1999, respectfully. In 2003, 
 some 58,000 incidents were staged by three million people, including farmers, 
 workers, teachers, and students. Among them, the largest group consisted of 
 1.66 million laid-off, retired, and active workers accounting for 46.9 percent 
 of the total number of participants that year. The surge social unrest continued 
 from 2004 to 2005 as the Ministry of Public safety announced a hike from a 
 total of 74,000 to 87,000 cases of riots demonstrations.51 
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Special attention should be paid to the timeline C.K. Lee illustrates for Liaoning. From 
1993, around the time the first Labor Contract was implemented, to 2005, Liaoning 
suffered from serious social discontent as a result of unpaid wages, and in particular 
unpaid pensions. During the 1990s, there were many state-owned enterprise 
bankruptcies that contributed to state-sector workers not receiving pensions. Currently, 
workers continue to suffer, as “in Shenyang, the provincial capital of Liaoning, a survey 
showed that between 1996 and 200, more than one-quarter of retired workers were 
owed pensions and one-quarter of employed workers were owed wages”.52 C.K. Lee 
explains Liaoning’s pension issue as a result of the state sector truly failing when it 
comes to the implementation of pension reform. Employees were ‘supposed’ to 
contribute between 5-7% of their monthly salary to a communal pension. This 5-7% 
pension contribution was prior to the 2008 modifications of the labor contract. Now, 
employees are required (as opposed to being encouraged) to contribute 8% of their 
monthly salary to a communal pension.53 Two issues have been taken up with this 
modification. Those who are forced to contribute 8% are fearful that they will not get 
their proper allotment of pension money and those who contributed their 5-7% prior to 
the new requirements of the 2008 Labor Contract want to retrieve their earned pension, 
but factories and industries fail to allot the proper amount of money. When those 
contributing their 8% now see that those who had contributed their 5-7% prior to the 
2008 regulations still have not been receiving their pensions, it is apparent why 
employees are wary to pay the required 8%. When state-sector workers in Liaoning see 
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that those able to retrieve their pension do not actually receive any, why would they 
want to contribute? This in itself illustrates the implementation failure of pension 
reform. China’s issue with implementation remains much more complex than simply 
enforcing laws and this notion will be further illustrated later in this chapter. However, 
important to note here is how C.K. Lee expresses, when it comes to implementation 
failure, that the state should shoulder the blame, “the state uses the law as a tool of 
control over society while allowing itself to remain mostly unrestrained by the law. 
When it is not in the interest of local officials to enforce labor regulations, there is 
hardly enough countervailing authority to uphold the law”.54 Minxin Pei also agrees 
with C.K. Lee, stating that “what laws are actually implemented are at the state’s 
discretion”.55 The pandemic of urban workers seeking unpaid pensions does not stop in 
the Liaoning province. The China Labor Bulletin has posted a number of various claims 
regarding workers wanting to claim their compensation. A worker of the Shaanxi 
Carbide Tool Company, located in Mianxian56, illustrates this point excellently, 
Yuan, originally from Wuhan in Hubei, earns 700 yuan a month, and this falls to 
a little over 600 yuan take-home pay, after pension contributions and other 
deductions. Yuan’s main concern, however, is his pension. The contribution 
shortfall came to light when it was spotted by local Social Security officials. 
They gave Yuan and other affected workers at the plant payment cards and told 
them to check the numbers carefully. “We did, and saw that, from 2003, there 
was nothing, just a blank” - even though pension deductions were made from 
their wages during this time. The hole in the records affects all workers currently 
employed (as opposed those to on the payroll but past retirement age), Yuan 
said. The social security bureau said the problem “is within the company” and 
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wanted nothing to do with it. But the procedural blockage could mean that some 
employees lose their pension eligibility.57 
 
By the time this post was written in 2008, new modifications had been made to the 2008 
Labor Contract. While protesting as a result of unpaid pensions might be a larger issue 
in the urban regions, such as Liaoning and Mianxian, it still remains an issue in rural 
regions, such as Guangdong. More importantly, this example from Mianxian sheds light 
on the fact that the government undoubtedly contributes to the poor implementation of 
the pension reform. Turning our focus back to Liaoning and Guangdong, in addition to 
the amount that urban and rural workers protest in regards to (not) receiving pension, 
both regions also suffer unpaid wages and massive layoffs that have plagued the lives of 
hundreds of thousands of urban and rural workers.  
 
 
b. The Unemployment Problem 
  
 Under the Labor Law, those declared ‘unemployed workers’58 were to receive 
some sort of compensation to assist them until they could find another job. However, 
those workers who have seen their jobs terminated have not been receiving the 
compensation the Labor Law promised, again illustrating this policy implementation 
issue.  	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 C.K. Lee discusses the story of a man named Zheng Wu, who suffers from both 
unemployment and unpaid wages. Wu was once a factory hand in a rubber plant in 
Tieling, located in Liaoning. Since 1991 he has been unemployed, alongside his wife 
(who also lost her job). Wu claims that “without wages, I will die either way, whether 
sitting here or laying on the railroad, so we went lying on the railroad”.59 C.K. Lee then 
continues to discuss just how critical this situation has become,  
Zheng Wu’s situation was hardly unique. Many aggrieved workers find 
themselves going back and forth between passivity, depression, and even self-
destruction, on the one hand, and outbursts of rage, desperation, and heroic acts 
of collective defiance on the other. Throughout the late 1990s, as mass layoffs 
continued unabated, Liaoning became a hotbed of labor unrest.60 
 
One might be inclined to think that Liaoning’s unemployment situation would gradually 
improve; however, Liaoning’s labor unrest from the late 1990s still remains prevalent in 
Liaoning,  
The era of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) may have faded, but the power and 
influence of many of these aging monoliths remains intact, especially in the old 
steel towns of northeast China that still rely on them for local employment and 
tax revenue. Employees in dispute with these SOEs face a major uphill battle to 
obtain any redress. As Liu Xiangdong, a 20-year veteran at the Lingyuan Iron 
and Steel Group in Liaoning discovered when he tried to sue the company for 
wrongful dismissal and get his wage and social security arrears back: “The local 
government will go to any lengths to protect the company’s interests they do not 
care about giving me my job back,” Liu told CLB Director Han Dongfang in an 
interview in August 2010.61 
 
The problem of unemployment looms just as large as a current issue in Liaoning as it 
does in Guangdong,  
The Supreme People’s Court (SPC) announced on 13 July 2009 that labor 
disputes in China as a whole climbed by 30 percent in the first half of 2009. 	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Certain areas saw sharper increases, with labor disputes in the first quarter of 
2009 shooting up by 41.6 percent in Guangdong, 50.3 percent in Jiangsu, and 
a staggering 159.6 percent in Zhejiang.62 
 
It is also important to note that the provinces discussed above represent some of the 
wealthier ones in the country. As a result, workers not only hope for their wages to be 
paid, but they also wish for an increase in their wages. Both of the aforementioned posts 
from the China Labor Bulletin represent interesting cases because in both instances the 
data comes from after the modifications of the 2008 Labor Contract.  
 
c. The Market Reform Problem 
 The policies that have been established by the Chinese government have been 
created for a reason: to ensure the livelihood of Chinese workers as well as to create a 
system where workers are protected under this unique form of capitalism. James 
Horsley illustrates how these policies may actually be quite beneficial for Chinese 
workers, but his main concern lies at the local level and how well the local level 
implements these reform policies. According to Horsley, regional and city local 
government leaders, put in charge by the Chinese government to enforce these laws, 
have not done a good job fulfilling their duties in a responsible manner. Horsley argues 
that it is the implementation at the local level is where the problem begins.  
 
 
i. China’s Implementation Issue 
  
 As stated in the previous section, Deng Xiaoping along with his other reformers 
wanted to move China in a direction that could effectively be molded into a more 	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capitalist based economy. Although this capitalist direction was beneficial for China’s 
economy, the switch wound up taking a severe toll on many of China’s citizens – 
especially those younger workers who had just begun to work under with the security of 
the danwei. However, it is true that throughout Deng’s reign specific policies were 
created to ensure that workers would be protected under this new market based 
economy. The details of some of these policies will be illustrated later in this paper; 
however, what is most important to turn our attention to now is the issue surrounding 
the implementation of these policies.  
 James Horsley does not deal directly with protesting in China; however, he 
explores the rule of law in China and sheds light on a few of the factors that have added 
fuel to China’s collective action. Upon studying law in China, Horsley has illustrated 
that China has successfully established laws over the past three decades; however, the 
country has fallen short when it comes to enforcing these laws. For example, Jamie 
Horsley explains that in 2004, the Chinese State Council committed itself to making a 
10 year reform program. The program called for the establishment of clear laws from an 
administrative perspective as well as a certain degree of governmental power, which 
included public participation and doing a better job of resolving social tension. These 
laws were crucial to central government reform and the implementation of these 
policies would allow the entire administrative process to improve.63A large part of this 
program included workers’ rights and giving workers a way to protect their rights. The 
2008 National Labor Law served to protect workers’ rights, but there have been huge 
issues with the actual implementation of these varying laws: 	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 The development of democracy and the rule of law stills falls short of the  needs 
 of economic and social development; the level framework….calls for 
 further improvement; in some regions and departments, laws are not 
 observed, or strictly enforced, violators are not brought to justice; local 
 protectionism departmental protectionism and difficulties in law enforcement 
 occur from time to time; some government functionaries take bribes and bend 
 the law, abuse their power when executing the law, abuse their authority to 
 override the law, and substitute their words for the law, thus bringing damage 
 to the social rule of law.64 
 
This issue of enforcement directly relates to workers, both rural and urban, because 
although the labor laws appear dependable in theory, all that truly matters is how well 
they can be put into practice. If they are not enforced, the workers suffer. For example, 
on October 17, 2011, more than a thousand workers working in a clock factory located 
in Shenzhen stopped production because of poor working conditions and overtime pay. 
The strike was sparked by a change in salary, announced on October 16.  On October 
17, workers went on official strike. When a reporter asked a worker the finer details on 
the strike, he found out that the factory had be deducting 40 minutes from their 
timecards every day since 2005 and that workers would be fined for taking wash room 
breaks. The protestors also claimed that the factory had failed to issue pension 
payments, which was alleged to be included once a worker signs an employer 
contract.65 The technicalities of this employer/employee contract will be clarified 
further later on in this paper, but the main point to take away from should be that this 
specific case of collective action embodies three labor laws that are supposed to be 
ensured when a worker begins work: pension, working conditions, and overtime wage 
salary. It is apparent that the labor law has not been properly implemented in this clock 
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factory. If laws had been enforced, workers would have a better chance of receiving 
proper treatment. However, the story serves as an important illustration of how local 
authorities are corrupt66 and how they may only be interested in furthering their own 
private agenda(s) rather than keeping their workers happy. In a chapter where Carolyn 
Hsu revises the meaning of political capital in China, she explains that political leaders, 
especially state cadres, do not follow the reform policies, because they are making 
money by not enforcing laws. Hsu interviews a thirty-six-year-old professor pertaining 
to the topic of corruption and implementation. The interviewee’s response was 
noteworthy,  
 Now, whatever you’re thinking of, you’re thinking of how to make yourself  
 wealthier, not caring about what policies are. And this includes those who are 
 supposed to be policy makers. Like if you ask people no, what is the policy 
 about this or that, even you ask professors at [the university], they’ll say, I  don’t 
 care. It’s none of my business. My deal is to figure out how to make a little 
 more money.67 
 
If state cadres, politicians, and managers know that they can get away with not 
enforcing the laws and improperly treating their workers, like withholding pensions and 
wages, they are more apt to do these things because they have no consequences to fear. 
Not only are they getting away with it, but they are making their own lives better 
through profiting by not enforcing policies. Christopher Smith illustrates this point 	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exceptionally, saying that “once the new reforms were introduced, the initial resistance 
appears to have been replaced fairly quickly by widespread corruption, bureaucratic 
“squeeze”, and bribery as unscrupulous officials took advantage of the new reforms to 
line their own pockets”.68 If managers fail to be punished for not enforcing laws and for 
not enforcing these laws, and if they continue making more money as a result, then why 
would they bother to implement laws in the first place? Implementation is a direct result 
of market reform that has not been thoroughly or carefully considered69. This is an issue 
that the Chinese government must deal with in order to more efficiently deal with this 
implementation issue.  
 
 
ii. Who Are Workers Blaming? 
 
 When we look at market reform and then take a deeper look at some of these 
reform policies, we see that implementation of these new reform policies has been a 
source of discontent. However, in addition to this implementation issue, William Hurst 
also illustrates in many of his interviews that there is a certain degree of Maoist 
nostalgia resonating in the minds of many workers.70 Change itself has been difficult for 
workers to come to terms with. In other words, workers that were gainfully employed 
during the Maoist era now long for the institutions that were present then and are now 
absent under the current regime. They long for those past policies which were directly 
beneficial for their livelihoods, as opposed to the current ones that seem more 
concerned with the growth of the economy.  Hurst explicates that in the rust belt of the 	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Northeast one frame of mind that lingers among workers is the “Maoist moral 
economy”, 
 This frame see’s China’s entire reform project as being to blame for  
 destroying a healthy socialist order that existed prior to the 1980s. the 
 Maoist golden age was one dominated by patron-client relationships, but also 
 one in which a general promise of equality prevailed, living standards were 
 stable (at least for urban workers) workers’ rights were protected, and patrons 
 fulfilled their obligations to clients. What has replaced this  order since 1980 is 
 political breakdown and social chaos in the contest of suddenly imposed severe 
 scarcity. Responsibility lies squarely on the shoulders of the central leadership 
 and reform agenda it has advanced in recent decades according to this frame.71 
 
An interesting point to take away from William Hurst’s perspective is that workers 
believed that the socialist planned economy that existed before the market era was a 
healthy system when in fact the system also caused a large amount of discontent among 
workers.72 In addition, workers were not necessarily upset with the new policies, but 
they may have been perturbed by the fact that these new policies did not give any 
personal guarantees. In other words, the risks that come along with the new reform 
agenda were enough to spark discontent among workers. Hurst interviews a coal miner 
who lived during both periods and expresses discontent with the new reform agenda,  
 Reform and opening stared around 1985. From that time everything has 
 consistently gotten worse and worse. Wages don’t get paid, people lose their 
 jobs, inequality has become worse than it was before liberation (1949). Even 
 the Japanese managed things in the Northeast better than today’s government 
 Managers are all corrupt nowadays and they get away with  everything… 
 during the planned economy we were all poor. But we were poor together.73 
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This particular miner goes on to explain that even if he and his fellow workers were to 
protest, nothing would be done. The miner blames the new reform agenda, but also 
blames the corruption in implementing policies, ultimately blaming the government for 
not being able to properly secure his rights as a worker. This miner’s case does not 
represent the only instance where the government has been blamed for poor 
implementation. I have read of many cases where taxi drivers often protest because of 
the government’s inability to crack down on the illegal cabs that roam the city free of 
daily surcharges. 
 
V. Putting the Pieces Together  
 It becomes apparent after considering China’s long history that the transition 
from a planned economy to a market-based economy has affected China’s enormous 
workforce. C.K. Lee’s regional analysis of both Liaoning and Guangdong argues that 
some of these present day market reform policies have contributed significantly to the 
strikes that have been occurring in these two regions. Especially when taking into 
consideration both the Labor Law and the newly revised 2008 Labor Law, it is evident 
that there are policies that have left promises to Chinese workers unfulfilled. The newly 
established pension policy particularly applies to this last statement. However, as 
helpful and informative as C.K. Lee’s literature has been, oftentimes her analysis 
remains too broad. My contribution to Lee’s scholarly approach has been to analyze 
within a micro-regional approach – one that shows the range and diversity of protesting 
on a case-by-case basis. For example, my own research has shown how citizens in the 
region of Guangdong are not all protesting for the same reason: pension and unpaid 
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wages, respectively. C.K. Lee’s approach undermines this important aspect of 
Guangdong’s current protesting atmosphere. 
 Like C.K. Lee, Hurst also offers a regional analysis; however, he differs from 
Lee in that he asks the reader to first consider a region’s political economy and then 
assess the degree of collective action occurring in that region accordingly. For example, 
Hurst considers a wide variety of regions from the industrial heartland in the northeast 
to the Shanghai municipalities; however, his first concern is assessing that particular 
regions political economy. Those living in Liaoning are being affected by the market 
reform policies, but they are being affected differently than those workers living in 
Shanghai or Guangdong. Hurst phrases this point exceptionally, saying that 
“northeastern workers experienced socialism as an economic boom…post socialism has 
been a dystopian nightmare in which northeastern workers have seen their gains striped 
away”.74 In other words, those workers in Liaoning attached more importance to the 
socialist planned economy established under Mao’s rule than those workers employed 
in Shanghai. Having previously benefited from this planned economy, one might 
understand how discontent could arise with post-socialism. These Liaoning workers 
encountered more hardship as a result of this political and economic change than those 
workers in Shanghai. Hurst uses this point to show the reader a dimension of collective 
action that had been undermined by the approach C.K. Lee proposes. However, in his 
own analysis of a region’s political economy, Hurst still manages to overlook a major 
factor of the countrywide discontent felt by so many in the workforce. My additional 
research has shown that regions with prospering political economies also suffer, but in 
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order to uncover this suffering it is necessary to examine the problem at a more sectoral 
level, in particular by looking within specific industries and occupational sectors. For 
example, Hurst considers Shanghai a region of economic prosperity. I concur with that 
point; however, my research covering Shanghai has still shown that specific industries, 
such as the transportation and electronics industries, have been more prone to protest 
despite the overall economic good fortune of the region. 
C.K. Lee allows the reader to understand the impact market reforms have had on 
two regions that are different, but have both been equally affected by market reforms. 
Hurst puts the pieces together by allowing us to view a more complete picture, 
identifying exactly why a region might be suffering. However, as comprehensive as 
Hurst’s literature is, we have discovered that his argument remains controversial. By 
asking to consider a region’s political economy, Hurst might be misleading the reader, 
who could mistakenly think that a region’s GDP is indicative of its working conditions. 
For example, Shanghai’s GDP is very high, and in fact, the China Daily recorded 
Shanghai’s Gross Domestic Product at 1.92 trillion yuan ($304 billion) in 2011. That is 
an 8.2% increase from 2010.75 Because Shanghai’s GDP is so high, one might conclude 
that the region is prospering economically and that, because of this, workers residing in 
this region are doing well. However, Shanghai’s GDP does not explain the protesting 
that is presently occurring, particularly with regards to the taxi and bus drivers, as well 
as the many factory workers in the region. Considering the regional level is extremely 
important, but in order to notice the more intricate underlying details behind employees’ 
unrest, one must probe further into the region by searching its cities and provinces to 	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  "Shanghai's GDP grows 8.2% in 2011." China Daily (Xinhua) Web. 22 Feb. 2012. 
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find a common motive behind protesting. As previously stated in the first chapter, 
Chinese workers do not have unions; therefore, voicing discontent often proves a 
difficult undertaking. Striking is considered illegal and the fact that workers are willing 
to go to this extreme on a national scale sends a clear message to us concerning the state 
of the present day Chinese work force. 
 The protests that have plagued China in the past two decades have continued to 
grow in number and frequency, but some of these protests have been more significant 
than others. For example, the CHAM-Honda strike has received a significant amount of 
coverage by international as well as national newspapers, while some strikes have gone 
by without being covered at all. I would like to make a distinction here, though, by 
pointing out that just because a strike might not have received coverage by a newspaper 
it should not be considered significant. In other words, the significance of a strike does 
not depend on the public notoriety it receives. A small strike might occur in the Pudong 
area located in the region of Shanghai, but just because the world fails to be notified of 
its occurrence does not make a less important event than such a well-known incident as 
the CHAM-Honda strike. Every strike that occurs in China says something significant 
about the country: China is currently in a decade of labor activism and while the country 
may be economically booming, internally the country is suffering.  
 These next two chapters will offer my insights pertaining to China’s collective 
action issue. Chapter three, in light of C.K. Lee’s regional approach and argument, will 
dissect the region of Guangdong to enlighten the reader to the number of protests that 
have been occurring at the city-level. Specificity is a vital part of reaching the root of a 
problem. Utilizing this method is important because it allows the reader to see the 
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diversity within these protests, as well as pinpointing what the issue is and in some 
cases how it can be resolved. Similarly to chapter three, Chapter four will analyze a 
plethora of China’s industrial sectors from taxi industries to the textile industries in light 
of Hurst’s argument based on the wellbeing of a region’s political economy. In 
highlighting China’s industrial sector, the reader will begin two crucial aspects of 
Chinese protest: first, the diversity within a specific industrial sector; and second, the 
grave issue with the implementation of new market reform policies. Both of these new 
frameworks bring forth a fresh new way in order to understand Chinese collective 
action. While market reform has caused a significant amount of discontent across 
China’s boarders, there are other aspects to consider in order to understand why this 
discontent has become so widespread.  
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Chapter Three: 
A Micro-Regional Framework to Analyze Collective Action 
  
 This chapter will highlight the importance of understanding the details of a 
conflict by analyzing protests within a given micro-region. The last two chapters have 
discussed different scholars’ opinions pertaining to the issue of collective action. C.K. 
Lee takes a regional approach when analyzing Chinese protests in light of the current 
market reform policies. In Guangdong, C.K. Lee has highlighted some of the policies 
cited as sources of discontent among workers. These policies include workers’ pensions, 
labor contracts, and workers’ health security. My research differs from C.K. Lee in that 
I consider a region’s urban cities instead of a taking a macro-regional approach as C.K. 
Lee does with Guangdong. I will add to Lee’s argument by examining protests within 
Guangdong; however, I will examine these protests by using a micro-regional scope, in 
particular investigating those cities located within the region of Guangdong. This micro-
regional approach will illustrate the range and diversity of protests that goes unnoticed 
by Lee’s macro-regional approach. Additionally, by utilizing this micro-regional 
approach, my research has shown that the sources for discontent have occurred across a 
far wider spectrum than what C.K. Lee’s literature illustrates. My research has shown 
that when we probe into Guangdong’s urban cities – Foshan, Guangzhou, Shenzhen, 
and Dongguan – workers have not necessarily exhibited discontent with market reform 
policies as C.K. Lee argues, but rather with the ways that the managerial level has 
enforced these policies. More specifically, my database has illustrated that managers 
have not been implementing policies correctly and as a result workers have suffered and 
begun voicing this discontent. Finally, my research has shown that the dynamic of 
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Chinese protesting has changed since C.K. Lee began conducting her research in the 
late 1990s and into the early 2000s. Lee was accurate in concluding from her analysis 
that Guangdong suffered significantly from the new market reform policies during the 
early and late 90s and even in the beginning of the 2000s; however, present day 
Guangdong workers have not continued to suffer exactly the same way that they did 
when these reforms were initially put in place. For example, current state-owned 
enterprises function quite differently than they used to in the early reform era. To be 
more precise, Lee analyzed a time period in which a significant amount of 
reconstruction was being done to these state-owned enterprises and within this 
reconstruction era, which happened to be the time frame of Lee’s research, market 
reform proved one of the primary indicators of workers’ discontent. Now, China has 
few of these state-owned enterprises, as many have been replaced by Sino-foreign joint 
enterprises as well as privately owned enterprises. Sino-foreign joint enterprises do not 
have to abide by national employee regulation and welfare laws since they are not state-
owned, and the unfortunate result has been the suffering of the workforce. This point 
will be illustrated in the next section of this chapter. 
  After considering the micro-regional level, it becomes apparent that the source 
of workers’ discontent has become diverse and multilayered. By mistakenly attributing 
vague, generalized causes of discontent such as pension payments to the region, we 
blind ourselves from the reality, the specific details of what has been going on in 
Guangdong. When we view Guangdong through the micro-regional scope I have 
proposed, we see that workers have actually had the opportunity to benefit greatly from 
the aforementioned reforms, but discontent has arisen where policies have not been 
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implemented properly and managers have cheated their employees out of these potential 
benefits.  
 The first section of this chapter will first examine the region of Guangdong and 
then analyze conflicts at the city-level in order to show the diversity of a conflict, 
neighboring conflicts, joint protesting, individual workers involved in the incident, 
causes cited, and a resolution if there was one. Taking these aspects into consideration 
illustrates how China’s collective action has become far more chaotic, decentralized, 
and varied on a specific case to case basis than what newspapers and scholars have been 
portraying. By following Lee’s regional approach, the reader misses a very important 
dimension of these incidents, namely the suffering that has been occurring within many 
of China’s different urban areas. This next chapter will elaborate on the diversity of 
protests at the micro-regional level, as well as highlight the constant struggle facing the 
Chinese people and their individual conflicts. More specifically, scholars have not 
considered the bigger picture: how these incidents have come about as a result of 
millions of workers and their collective suffering. But, why have they been suffering 
recently? Who have workers been targeting and blaming? Have there been resolutions? 
Who has stood to benefit through these protests? This next chapter will answer these 
questions and provide case by case conclusions as to why workers have been resorting 
to protest to express their discontent. In summary, the creation of a market economy has 
caused many issues in numerous areas throughout China; however, when we delve into 
the city-levels of China’s vast regions, the reader may come to understand that market 
reforms have not been the sole of this unrest.  
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I. A Micro Regional Analysis of Guangdong  
 We learned earlier in the first chapter that C.K. Lee has done extensive research 
pertaining to the issue of collective action in both the regions of Guangdong and 
Liaoning in light of the 1980s market reforms. My research has shown that lack of 
social security and unpaid pensions have become a serious problem in Guangdong; 
however, many other issues in addition to these have caused the significant amount of 
discontent that workers in this region currently suffer from. My research has shown that 
the reasoning behind why workers have been protesting may not simply be due to 
market reforms, but perhaps also to workers’ expectations not necessarily being met by 
employers. In addition to workers’ expectations not being met, there are some serious 
enforcement and policy implementation problems at not only the managerial levels, but 
at the local government official levels, as well, and in many cases workers have blamed 
these authorities as opposed to the overarching market reform policies.  
 This section will not extensively cover the region of Liaoning, but will instead 
concentrate on the region of Guangdong. From C.K. Lee’s perspective, the region of 
Guangdong suffers from two main problems: lack of social security and unpaid 
pensions. A pension system was established during the 1990s so that workers could feel 
a sense of security once the time came to retire. More specifically, relating to the topic 
of pension, workers in Guangdong have been having difficulty transferring their 
pensions when making the decision to take on a new job. Inter-regional transferring of a 
worker’s pension remains a vital component of a Chinese worker’s contract because this 
pension allows him or her to retire and live comfortably; however, the policy has not 
been working as effectively as it should. As a result of this policy failing, many workers 
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have put their tools down and resorted to protesting to demonstrate their discontent. 
Before continuing, I would like to add a vital piece of information that I do not feel 
C.K. Lee has sufficiently explored in her book: both Guangdong and Liaoning represent 
two areas greatly affected by the newly established market reform policies. When 
studying these two regions, we need to remember this fact. More specifically, the 
danwei and iron rice bowl notions were prominent factors in both Liaoning and 
Guangdong workers’ lives, and robbing them of the things that once instilled security in 
so many minds, one cannot be too surprised that pensions (among other policies) have 
not been able to immediately reestablish the peace of mind that the danwei system once 
gave them. China’s decision to transform from a planned economy to a market-oriented 
society left those who had worked under the planned economy with no real sense of 
protection. In line with C.K. Lee’s thoughts, I have decided to probe further into 
Guangdong. My research has shown that workers in Guangdong have not only been 
protesting over their missing pension payments, but also in response to unpaid wages, 
non-recognition of overtime hours, rising fuel prices, and poor working conditions. 
Although these are just a few of the reasons, it is important to highlight these issues 
precisely because of their diversity, and also because this diversity speaks to the core of 
the issue behind China’s protests.  
  
 a. Foshan    
 Foshan is a small city located in the center of Guangdong province. The city has 
long been renowned within the porcelain industry, but within the last 25 years this 
particular province has transformed into China’s third largest industrial base along the 
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Pearl River Delta. Before 1992, Foshan was a city mostly inhabited by state-owned 
enterprises, but now the city flourishes by means of private domestic and Sino-foreign 
enterprises. As stated early in the first and second chapters, privately owned enterprises 
have had a turbulent past within China’s borders. During the 1950s-1970s, the country 
banned privately owned enterprises for multiple reasons, the most important of which 
was that the national laws that were enforced during this time period did not apply to 
industries that were not state-owned. In other words, privately owned enterprises could 
choose to ignore national laws. Therefore, the policies established to protect the workers 
within that industry did not actually do so because it was up to the private enterprise(s) 
to create their own protection policies. In many cases, these private firms would 
completely ignore national policies and disregard any sort of protection for their 
workers. In addition to ignoring national protection policies, these private enterprises 
would ignore contract policies. We learned earlier that a worker’s contract is vital to the 
longevity of his or her career at whatever establishment they decide to work. The 
contract affords them a rest hour during the day, maternity leave, and other benefits that 
should be allocated to a worker to ensure continued productivity and health. However, 
many of these private enterprises have had their workers sign these contracts and then 
simply elect not to implement any of the benefits “guaranteed” to them.  
In the present day, Foshan has transformed once again to a city occupied by 
privately owned enterprises. Many of these privately owned enterprises are also Sino-
foreign joint enterprises. These joint enterprises can be good for China because by 
having them within the country’s borders, they can foster business relationships that 
help boost the domestic economy. Furthermore, these mutually beneficial relationships 
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also have the ability to demonstrate that China has attempted to become a more globally 
friendly nation. CHAM-Honda represents one such joint enterprise currently operating 
within Foshan. China and Japan have partnered in this auto industry so that, by forming 
this relationship, both nations benefit mutually by the success of the company overall. 
When the Honda industry does well, it reflects positively on China since the plant 
operates geographically within Chinese territory, while at the same time Japan sees 
firsthand how well the company advances because it owns the rights to the product. 
However, Sino-foreign joint enterprises have proven themselves vulnerable to negative 
consequences for the Chinese workers within the CHAM-Honda industry, in addition to 
the potential for mutual positive gains by the respective countries overall. In the first 
chapter, I briefly touched on the significance of the CHAM-Honda strike, but now I 
would also like to explain how this particular strike has become significant on a micro-
regional level.  
We learned earlier from C.K. Lee’s research on Guangdong that, at the regional 
level, workers residing within this province suffer from missing pension payments, 
unemployment, and wage issues. Wage issues can range from being too low to being 
nonexistent altogether. However, as useful as C.K. Lee’s scholarship has been in 
highlighting these problems, her research remains too broad sighted when trying to 
discern the precise details – figuring out the full story behind why workers remain 
discontent. The reader seldom truly understands why workers have encountered these 
issues. More specifically, C.K. Lee does not illustrate in her literature the specific 
details that explain precisely why Guangdong workers have not been receiving pension 
payments and why their wages have remained so low.  
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Simply by investigating Guangdong’s Foshan city, my research has shown that 
the answer relating specifically to the CHAM-Honda instance becomes more evident 
with a deeper look than C.K. Lee’s approach could provide. Because CHAM-Honda 
represents a Sino-foreign joint enterprise, the business enterprise has been able to 
escape without enforcing or following the national labor laws. One could view this 
incident occurring in light of market reform; however, this specific CHAM-Honda case 
retains far more relevance once its details have been discerned than the suggestion of its 
broad generalization as a casualty of market reforms. In fact, those workers in the 
CHAM-Honda factories have received opportunities that not many others in the region 
have: a steady job with an actual salary. This case, as large as it was, has a very specific 
problem that lies at the managerial level within this enterprise. When the reader 
understands this incident boils down to a “managerial” issue within a Sino-foreign joint 
enterprise, it becomes clear that workers have not been upset by market reforms, but 
rather because of the way managers of privately owned enterprise have been enforcing 
policies. In reality, it is the glaring absence of policy implementation creating the rift, 
and workers like Huang have laid down their tools and walked out on the industries that 
have not been treating them properly as a result.  
I will note here that the CHAM-Honda incident involves multiple layers, and 
that many factors contributed to the dissatisfaction felt by its workers; however, the 
most important thing to take away from this incident is that the recognition of these 
private and Sino-foreign joint enterprises would never have surfaced if we had not 
focused our investigation all the way to the city level. In other words, workers have not 
been protesting social security and pension. By revisiting the CHAM-Honda case and 
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using its micro-region as the scope of analysis, the reader can become fully aware of a 
situation unique to Foshan: the existence of privately owned Sino-foreign enterprises. 
By highlighting this fact, it becomes clear how unique and specific underlying motives 
can be on a case by case basis, but in addition, the reader also may begin to notice how 
truly diverse protesting has become in China, even within a small city in Guangdong. 
Now we will turn our attention to a few more cases within the Guangdong region.  
 
b. Guangzhou 
 Guangzhou represents another city located in Guangdong, like Foshan, although 
Guangzhou is somewhat larger than the latter, and contains a significant number of 
industrial factories. Like Foshan, this city also suffers from a significant amount of 
discontent among its workers. On March 28, 2011, factory workers from a Guangzhou 
sanitation plant took to the streets in response to a failed wage increase agreement.76 As 
mentioned earlier, wages have been cited frequently in the complaints of protesting 
workers. However, this incident occurred not solely because of unpaid wages, but also 
because of issues surrounding a pre-negotiated deal collaborated by both the 
management and employees of the factory. I will also add here that this agreement 
specified limits on overtime hours, increased meal subsidies, and improved living 
conditions in the workers’ dormitories. When workers did not receive the wage increase 
discussed earlier, in addition to not receiving proper overtime-hourly pay, they came 
together and staged a strike. Highlighting this particular strike proves interesting for a 
few reasons. The interaction between management and employee in this case is unique. 
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When analyzing protests at a broader level, as C.K. Lee does, one does not become 
privy to this kind of communication between workers and management. In fact, it seems 
almost unbelievable that this type of communication would actually occur. This type of 
interaction is important to highlight because it illustrates that members at the managerial 
level have sought to satisfy their workers. Another aspect of this strike that I feel 
equally inclined to highlight is the fact that, upon becoming aware of this understanding 
– that the managers have attempted to help benefit their employees – the whole 
protesting dynamic becomes altered.  
After reading C.K. Lee’s literature, the reader may find many negative 
connotations pertaining to protesting, which can linger throughout her entire book. 
Also, the reader may begin to believe the idea that “all Chinese workers are discontent.” 
While many workers might be dissatisfied with current circumstances, not all of 
China’s workers have begun staging mass protests. Workers do not always take this 
course of action, but they might strike for the aforementioned reasons, because there 
was a specific negotiation and the company did not follow through on what was 
discussed. After the strike occurred, it has since been verified that the workers who 
were given promises – the street sweepers – received advanced pay in addition to 
receiving their overtime hours.77  
 Although this case exemplifies a particularly “happy ending” – where both 
workers and managers end up content – this is not always the case. In fact, there have 
been many cases where workers went on strike and still did not receive the 
compensation they hoped for. However, the aforementioned Guangzhou instance does 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
77 “Migrant Worker Union Negotiates Pay Deal for Tianjin Cleaners” China Labor Bulletin (2002):  Web. 
1 April 2011. 
	  	   68	  
embody a certain degree of organization through an analysis of the strike. Also, by 
looking at the case through a micro-regional scope, we see that lines of communication 
(can) exist between workers and management. At a broader level, this fact would have 
gone unnoticed. When considering the dynamic of a protest – and every protest has its 
own distinct dynamic – communication always remains a small but vital aspect of 
negotiations. If workers have been promised certain rewards, but have not received 
these rewards, this in itself becomes a reason for protest. As mentioned earlier, every 
protest has a different dynamic, and this lends itself to C.K. Lee’s market reform 
argument. Communication between management and employees would have never 
occurred within a socialist planned economy. If workers were discontent, they most 
likely would have remained that way, and I feel this is a point worthy of mentioning. In 
light of new market reform policies, workers now have the ability to voice their 
opinions, and although not all cases achieve the same degree of success as the one 
mentioned above, similar stories exist where workers succeeded in having their 
demands met through protesting. The unfortunate reality seems to be that incidents 
often occur where workers do not end up as lucky as the aforementioned incident. With 
that in mind, we will now turn our attention to a case in Shenzhen – one that represents 
the sad story of a strike failing to achieve any success. 
  
 c. Shenzhen 
 Shenzhen is another large city located in Guangdong that happens to be heavily 
populated by electronic factories. Jingmo Electronics is a small factory located in the 3rd 
industrial district of Shajing township and employs 3,000 people. This particular 
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company manufactures keyboards for Apple and IBM.78 This particular job frequently 
asks workers to work overtime. Shipments are often due at the beginning of the month 
and if a certain quota has not been met then workers find themselves forced to work 
even longer hours than the normal day demands. The normal work day ranges from 10-
12 hours, while an overtime day may demand a worker stay up to 15 hours with 1 hour 
of total rest included for both lunch and dinner breaks. Rest room breaks were not 
mentioned in the article, but many other articles have mentioned that if a worker stops 
to use the rest room more than three times a day they could possibly incur fines.  
 On the morning of November 22, approximately 1,000 workers at the factory 
had a meeting and arrived at the conclusion that the time had come to do something 
about the unjust overtime demands, which came with little compensation.79 China 
Labor Watch explains the strike as the following:  
 On the morning of November 22nd, 1,000 workers at the factory held a 
 meeting in which they decided to strike, owing to the unreasonable overtime 
 demands made on them by management.  One by one, they walked off the job 
 and moved to block National highway 107 in protest. By the time the 
 protesters decided to end the demonstration and disperse, authorities had 
 assigned several hundred police officers, including riot police, to the protest.80 
 
This article goes on to explain the finer details of the protest. According to the 
information that China Labor Watch has collected from various workers that 
participated in this strike, it seems this protest stemmed from unreasonable overtime 
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demands made by the electronic management. China Labor Watch gives us additional, 
specific information pertaining to these overtime hours,  
 The factory decided to require workers to work from 6 p.m. until 12 p.m., and 
 sometimes even until 2 a.m. the next morning, in addition to their regular  work 
 hours (7-11:30 a.m., 1-5 p.m.) Workers now commonly worked anywhere from 
 100 to 120 hours of overtime a month. Moreover, the factory refused to let the 
 workers work this overtime on Saturday, which would necessitate paying them 
 double wages in accordance with Chinese Labor Law.81 
 
In conjunction with long overtime hours, which came with little or no compensation, 
workers also suffered injuries at a high rate from machines that have not been updated 
by the factory. Workers have also complained of verbal abuse from managers.  
 One might reasonably assume that with a large strike involving as many as 
1,000 workers management would attempt to modify their systems so that workers 
could become content. However, in reality, management chose to stand by and do 
nothing about their workers’ dissatisfaction with overtime hours. In fact, the factory has 
now stated that it will be reducing each employee’s overtime average as a result of the 
strike.  
 This case highlights three specific areas of discontent: first, overtime hours and 
compensation from these overtime hours; second, health benefits; and third, managerial 
abuse. Pertaining to overtime hours, I will add here that workers seem happy to work 
these hours as long as they are being paid appropriately. I will also add that this factory 
remains a state-owned factory, meaning that the state requires its management to have 
employees sign labor contracts and also to give workers correct compensation. 
Although the ending to this story does not have the happy ending of the previously 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
81 Qiang, Li. "1,000 Workers Strike at Factory That Makes Keyboards for Apple and IBM." China Labor 
Watch. 23 Nov 2011. Web. 22 Feb 2012. <http://www.chinalaborwatch.org/news/new-377.html>. 	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visited case (in Guangzhou), it does highlight some interesting points when considering 
strikes in general. This particular case highlights both a law-based and a non-law based 
protest. In other words, when a case has been classified as non-law based, it has often 
occurred because of unfair treatment. The unique nature of this case involves the fact 
that the workers protested unfair treatment in addition to seeking correct 
implementation of an overtime policy. Another interesting aspect of protesting that this 
case brings to light is the fact that, as workers have often done in these situations, their 
dissatisfaction leads them to turn their backs on the company that has chosen not to 
obey the law – not the state or local government that should have been enforcing these 
policies. The government has placed a certain degree of trust in their state-owned 
enterprises and expects these companies to enforce their newly established policies. 
However, this case highlights a significant communication issue. From the worker’s 
perspective, they reasonably expect government-issued laws to be abided by and 
implemented by management. With the government remaining ignorant to this issue, 
managers have effectively been allowed to cheat their employees, as this case 
illustrates. To summarize, this case highlights that the governmental level needs to 
become more engaged with these companies and to keep a closer watch over them to 
ensure proper policy and law enforcement, and that workers receive fair treatment. 
Although we have already examined a case where management does not take 
responsibility for poorly implemented policies, this case illustrates how much these 
companies can get away with when it comes to protecting their workers. It also 
illustrates how much harm a strike can actually affect current employees, rather than 
benefiting them in the end. Now, we will now turn our attention to Dongguan. 
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 d. Dongguan  
 Dongguan is one of Guangdong’s most complex industrial cities. Dongguan is 
divided into four townships, each consisting of more than 28 towns. That being said, 
Dongguan suffers a significant amount of discontent from its local (town) population. 
One case from my database that resonates particularly is an incident that occurred at the 
Lee Precision watch factory located in Dongguan’s Chang’an Town.82 On June 15, 
2011, hundreds of Lee Precision workers took to the streets, suspending production at 
this local watch factory in response to dissatisfaction with management. In an attempt 
by the company to find an easier way to lay off their workers, the factory’s managers 
decided to introduce a new mandatory overtime system. In other words, workers would 
be forced to work an allotted amount of overtime, and if they did not reach this quota 
for hours of overtime then they would be laid off. More specifically, when a Southern 
News reporter named Lee asked a formerly laid off worker how bad overtime hours had 
become, the employee replied that he often had been forced to work between 4-6 hours 
of overtime on a daily basis. The worker also added that in addition to the factory’s new 
installation of the “mandatory overtime” system, workers found themselves being fined 
for using the restroom. The following afternoon, hundreds of workers took their 
complaints to the Chang’an local government. It has since been reported that the 
Chang’an local government, in response to the amount of workers expressing 
dissatisfaction, has begun an investigation into the conditions under which workers have 
been forced to work at the Lee Precision watch factory. There have been no follow up 
reports on this incident regarding the status of the government’s investigation.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
82 See report 56.  
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 Before this case, we had seen that discontent workers had chosen to turn their 
backs on their managers and express their concerns towards them directly. However, in 
this particular incident, we see something new: upset workers going straight to their 
local government in search of help. My research has shown that there have only been a 
few cases where workers have turned to their local government(s) for help, but in this 
case, probably due to the volume of complaints directed at one company, the 
government decided that the best course of action was to investigate the problem. 
Although there has been no information released regarding the final outcome of this 
protest or the subsequent investigation, the fact that the local government decided to get 
involved says something about the degree of the complaints filed against the watch 
factory. Workers have been suffering, and to such an extent where they have become 
willing to try any means at their disposal to protect their rights as employees. 
 
II. Micro-Regionally Understanding Guangdong  
 In looking at just a few cities within Guangdong, the reader has begun to see the 
diversity of Chinese protesting dynamics in just a few small towns and industrial 
districts within China’s vast region of Guangdong. Although C.K. Lee has brought our 
attention to this region, one must delve within the city level to truly understand the 
diverse nature of the protests that have been occurring within this region. Historically, 
Guangdong may have been a region affected by market reform policies; however, this 
diversity does not stop within the borders of Guangdong. In fact, my research has 
shown that many others among China’s vast regions have suffered similarly for a 
multitude of reasons. Zhejiang, another region I have studied has shown a significant 
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amount of diversity when we explore within its city-levels. Although this chapter will 
not consider Zhejiang more in depth, I have created a small graph with some of the 
incidents I came across at the city-level: 
 
Region City Occupation Reason 1 Reason 2 Resolution 
Zhejiang Jinhua Animal Rights Activists  
Stop annual 
holiday 
tradition that 
dog slaughters 
more than 
5,000 dogs 
none 
Event is now 
banned by 
government 
Zhejiang Wenzhou Transportation: Taxi Drivers Illegal cabs none none 
Zhejiang Hangzhou Transportation: Taxi Drivers 
Stagnant 
wages Fuel prices  none 
Zhejiang Anji Factory Workers: Furniture 
Demanding 
wages after 
plant went 
bankrupt 
none none 
Zhejiang Jinhua Supermarket Employees Wages 
Improper 
compensation of 
overtime hours, 
improper 
termination of 
employee contracts 
none 
                 Sources: See Appendix A Reports, 1, 15, 16, 65, 70.  
 
Like Guangdong, when we consider Zhejiang’s urban areas of Jinhua, Anji, Jiaxin, 
Huangzhou, and Wenzhou, we see that there reasons abound behind workers discontent 
ranging from animal abuse, to illegal cabs. Additionally, we see that the same 
occupational sector in different urban areas – in this case, the taxi sector – has been a 
targeted source of discontent and victim of protesting throughout. 
 The next chapter will further explore William Hurst’s previously mentioned two-
pronged argument. William Hurst, like C.K. Lee, also utilizes a regional analysis in light 
of market reform policies, but he contributes further by additionally considering a 
region’s political economy. Considering a region’s political economy can be helpful 
because it can provide elaboration on specific details pertaining to the “why” behind 
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workers protesting. For example, workers in Liaoning have been protesting more 
frequently because this specific region relied heavily on their individual respective 
“danwei” to ensure stability in their lives. Liaoning workers, upon being fired, have 
found it more difficult to find new work than those workers located in areas fortunate 
enough to have booming economies. By contrast, workers in Shanghai have not been as 
reliant on this “danwei” system and have been able to find work elsewhere more easily. 
Therefore, the chance for advancement and opportunity in being able to find a job differs 
in an economically booming area, as opposed to one where the local economy is 
struggling. The next chapter will contribute to Hurst’s political economy argument by 
allowing the reader to consider another important dimension of an areas doing well 
economically: specific occupations within the region. In shedding light on specific 
occupational sectors within a region with a steady, successful economy, it soon becomes 
apparent that region’s may thrive while, simultaneously, specific industries and 
occupational sectors struggle or bear the brunt of the region’s success. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter Four: 
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A Sectoral Framework to Analyze Collective Action 
 
 C.K. Lee does not represent the only scholar who, by basing her analysis at the 
regional level, overlooks a significant amount of relevant and important information 
pertaining to the underlying reasons behind Chinese workers protesting. We have 
learned earlier in the first and second chapters that William Hurst has also utilized a 
regional-level analysis in his own work. He differs from C.K. Lee by considering a 
region’s political economy first before analyzing protest(s) within that region. More 
specifically, if a region has been doing economically well, he proposes that the 
protesting dynamic there will differ from that of a region whose economy has been 
struggling. Also akin to C.K. Lee, Hurst considers both the areas of Liaoning and 
Guangdong; however, in order to understand the reasons for which these two areas have 
been protesting, he considers the political economy of each. For example, Liaoning has 
been an area negatively affected by the 1980s market reforms. Upon losing their jobs, 
workers have had trouble finding other opportunities for employment within the region, 
so these workers have resorted to protesting as a result. By considering Liaoning’s 
political economy following the 1980s market reforms, one might begin to understand 
that because these changes directly affected this area, workers have been more prone to 
protest these reforms. However, Hurst does something that C.K. Lee does not by 
shedding light on the specific areas that have been affected by the 1980s market 
reforms, particularly the regions that depended heavily upon the danwei system. 
Liaoning happens to represent an area once heavily populated by state-owned 
enterprises. By introducing this information to his readers, Hurst provides some 
justification as to why workers in this region have been striking. Hurst does succeed in 
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adding to C.K. Lee’s regional analysis, but like Lee he also undermines the amount of 
protesting going on in those areas that have not been suffering economic downturns, 
especially Shanghai.  
 While Hurst’s method of analyzing a region’s political economy can be helpful 
in deducing why workers may sometimes be more prone to blame market reform 
policies, this approach can also be deceiving. Since a region’s economic success fails to 
paint a complete picture at times, it does not always present itself as a fair tool with 
which to discern why workers have been more content, or less so, in certain regions 
compared to others. For example, a brief look at Shanghai showed us that this region 
has done particularly well from an economic perspective. However, my research has 
shown that workers in Shanghai have continued to protest despite this overall economic 
prosperity. The next section of this paper will show that Shanghai does not stand alone 
as the only economically successful region that suffers demonstrations of discontent 
from its workforce. Jiangsu and Guangdong have displayed similar economic 
achievement, but these two regions have also suffered from a considerable amount of 
discontent felt by the workers in their respective regions. Thus, a region’s economic 
success should not be given any extra weight when considering or trying to discover the 
underlying reasons for protest in an area whose economy might not be succeeding as 
much as that of Shanghai. To be more precise, my research has illustrated that specific 
occupational sectors within Shanghai have continued to engage in protests and strikes 
despite the region’s success overall.  
 Another insight of this thesis will illustrate that when we take an approach as 
broad as a region’s political economy, it really only allows us to see the numbers that 
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illustrate overall regional prosperity. This regional view presents itself as overly 
objective in the sense that we do not truly see how well the individual workers within a 
region survive, simply by the economic numbers the area displays. When we attempt to 
judge the wellbeing of a region’s population by the economic success of the area, or the 
rate of unemployment, we miss some significant information pertaining to the actual 
state of living for individual workers and occupations. In other words, an objective 
point of view gives us an inaccurate interpretation as to why collective action has been 
occurring. This thesis takes the subjective point of view when looking at regions with 
prospering economies, looking within occupational sectors to paint a fuller picture of 
these areas. When we look at regions with thriving economies under a subjective light, 
we see that the discontent in these areas has not as much to do with the regions’ overall 
success, and more to do with the fact that workers have actually been comparing their 
own success to that of their peers and their companies. In other words, when workers 
see how well their company, industry, or region has been doing overall, these 
individuals become more sensitive to the distribution of this wealth. Thus, workers 
within an area with a successful, thriving economy may be more inclined to feel entitled 
to share in this success, as my research has shown. Furthermore, when workers in these 
particular areas and sectors feel as though they have been unjustly treated, because of 
something like low wages relative to the success of the company, industry, or region, 
my research has shown that they may be more inclined to outwardly voice their 
dissatisfaction and request treatment as employees that reflects the same level of 
economic success being enjoyed on a broader scale around them. 
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 The next section of this chapter will introduce the final contribution of my 
research: focusing on specific occupational sectors to analyze a region and offer an 
explanation for why workers have engaged in protesting. More specifically, this paper 
will consider three cases in three different regions within China’s vast electronics 
industry. These three cases will shed light upon three Sino-foreign joint owned 
enterprises, three large-scale incidents of discontent, and three incredibly time-sensitive 
factories. When we analyze the dynamic of the electronics industry and the protests that 
have occurred in the past year, it becomes very clear that maltreatment becomes a more 
common occurrence for workers within Sino-foreign joint owned enterprises operating 
on time-sensitive schedules in larger factories. Hurst’s argument might propose that 
because these regions have all been objectively deemed economic hotspots within the 
country, that protesting would be a last resort (if it even garnered consideration at all); 
however, I have found that when we look subjectively within China’s electronics 
industry, protests have been occurring because workers have been comparing 
themselves to not only their companies’ economic achievements, but also the success 
being enjoyed by their peers, as well.  
 This perspective represents a completely new way in which to view Chinese 
protesting, and its importance lies in the fact that it explains why, in areas with 
successful economies (where we would expect to find a content workforce), we still 
find that workers have been resorting to collective action. This next section will take a 
similar path to the one previous, as I will first consider a region studied by Hurst and 
then shed light on his argument utilizing the contributions of my analysis by 
occupational sector. I will then shed light on a region I have studied and illustrate 
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similarities between these two economically flourishing regions in light of their 
electronics sectors. More specifically, the first section of this chapter will consider the 
electronics sector within Shanghai, a region studied by Hurst. My research has 
confirmed that Shanghai does represent an economically flourishing region; however, 
when we explore further, going deeper into Shanghai’s specific occupational groups, 
especially the electronics industry, the reader sees that electronics workers have been 
affected dramatically by the region’s economic success. Specifically, these workers’ 
perspectives have been altered by the success: they feel that their own treatment as 
individual workers should reflect and mirror the same economic success being enjoyed 
by the region as a whole. In addition to considering Shanghai, this next section will also 
look at the electronics industry within Jiangsu and Guangdong, two other regions that 
have demonstrated significant economic achievement. By considering two other regions 
that display economic prosperity, we will begin to see a significant trend between 
workers in the electronics industry that happen to be located in (separate) economically 
prospering regions.  
 To summarize, my research has shown that, while helpful, Hurst’s political 
economy argument concentrating on a region’s GDP may not be the best tool with 
which to analyze protesting. My research will contribute to Hurst’s by also considering 
a region’s political economy, but going one step further by asking the reader to 
additionally consider the specific occupational sectors of the regions in China that have 
continued to demonstrate economic success. My research has shown that even in such 
economically prospering regions as Shanghai, Jiangsu, and Guangdong, workers – 
specifically those employed within the electronics sector – have been protesting because 
	  	   81	  
they have been bearing the brunt of the regions’ economic achievements. These workers 
have seen firsthand the success being enjoyed by the region and industry, and they have 
begun to question why their own success has not happened in parallel. 
 
I. A Sectoral Analysis of Shanghai 
 Shanghai, located on the southern coast of China, happens to be one of the 
country’s smallest regions with an area of 6,340.5 square kilometers. However, despite 
its relatively small size, what Shanghai lacks in geographical stature it makes up for in 
far-reaching economic achievements. Shanghai has not only been China’s top city for 
importing and exporting, but it has also been renowned as the commercial and financial 
center of mainland China. In the past year, Shanghai’s Gross Domestic Product has 
increased 10.3% to 1,716.6 billion RMB.83 However, as promising as these facts might 
seem on the surface, my research has shown that a look into the electronics sector of 
Shanghai shows common protesting despite the region’s success.  
  
 a. A Glance at Shanghai’s Electronics sector  
 The Yangpu District, located in the northeast part of Shanghai, has long been 
known for its close proximity to the Bund, a major tourist attraction in Shanghai. 
However, recently the Yangpu District has received attention and coverage from local 
newspapers because of a string of protesting outbreaks. On December 2, 2011 more 
than 1,000 workers from the Hi-P International Ltd., a Sino-Singapore joint owned 
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track of all of China’s provinces and well-known inner cities. Economic data is registered daily and these 
daily archives span from 2005-present. All data is verified and accurate. Jin, Tony, Helen Zhao, and et 
al. The China Perspective. 27 Feb 2012. Web. 28 Feb 2012. 
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enterprise, staged a protest in response to massive lay-offs occurring within the factory. 
84Workers who had been victimized by the layoffs had received neither notification nor 
proper compensation for the termination of their jobs, and workers who had not been 
laid off also complained of low wages. When asked by local officials why the company 
had decided let go of so many of its workers, Hi-P responded through email with the 
following message:  
 The company said it faces “pricing pressure, higher materials costs due to 
 change in product mix, increased labor costs, additional costs due to activities 
 arising from sites’ consolidation,” according to its third-quarter earnings 
 report. The company’s revenue gained 8.1 percent to S$308.6 million ($240 
 million) during the three-month period, while net profit plunged 81 percent to 
 S$6.47 million.85 
 
In summary, the company responded to being faced with increased material and labor 
costs by deciding to dismiss workers, despite the strides it had achieved in revenue 
gains overall. In addition, they opted not to properly compensate the workers chosen for 
dismissal. Before continuing, I will also add that prior to this email being sent, when 
asked by a local news reporter why the company had decided to lay off so many of its 
workers, the head manager replied, “ Hi-P plans to relocate, not lay off workers. We had 
no intention of laying off our workers…they are overreacting to the situation”.86 
Regardless of the company’s claims, its decision to dismiss workers in such an 
irresponsible manner has caused significant discontent. Hurst would claim that these 
workers, living in an economically thriving region, would have little to no difficulty 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
84  See Report 64. 
85 Tighe, Michael. "Workers Protest at Hi-P Factory in Shanghai Following Layoffs." Bloomberg 
Businessweek. (2011): Web. 27 Feb. 2012. <http://www.businessweek.com/news/2011-12-04/workers-
protest-at-hi-p-factory-in-shanghai-following-layoffs.html>. 
86 Tighe, Michael. "Workers Protest at Hi-P Factory in Shanghai Following Layoffs." Bloomberg 
Businessweek. (2011): Web. 27 Feb. 2012. <http://www.businessweek.com/news/2011-12-04/workers-
protest-at-hi-p-factory-in-shanghai-following-layoffs.html>. 
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finding a new job. However, having been fired without adequate advance notice and 
without being given proper compensation, the likelihood that these workers succeed in 
finding new jobs fast enough to be able to support themselves and their families remains 
low.  
 It remains important to note that, although individual workers may not have 
been intimately aware of the details and numbers surrounding the economic 
achievements being made by the company, it logically follows that they would have 
taken notice of the company’s success – surely seeing no signs of its struggling. In other 
words, the company’s success and economic achievement could not have gone 
unnoticed by its workforce (to some degree at least). In turn, it may be this very 
perception by the Hi-P workforce, and others in similar situations where a company’s 
success has been apparent, that has been a leading cause of discontent among workers 
and fueling the protesting dynamic, especially within a region like Shanghai where 
economic wellbeing does not fly under the radar to its population.  
 As workers continue to contribute to the success of their company, they become 
concerned with making sure they receive treatment that reflects that success. With 
regards to this specific aforementioned case, workers expected to be treated a certain 
way by their managers because the company had been seeing a notable rise in revenue. 
Although it may not necessarily be the managers’ only responsibility to fire workers, it 
does remain in their power to enforce the laws that protect their workers, including 
contracts and pension payments. Outside of these managers’ direct obligations to their 
still-employed workers, though, additional laws exist to protect and provide for workers 
in the event of termination of their position(s), namely some type of compensation to 
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suffice until they can find work elsewhere. It alarms workers when, despite the apparent 
success of their company or region, they still fail to receive just treatment that speaks 
directly to this perceived success. They logically question the motivation behind such 
unfair treatment, and engage in protests and strikes to protect themselves when they feel 
no one else will, even in the face of the National Labor Law, policies that these 
companies do not even try to enforce, which ought to protect them but goes by without 
adequate enforcement or implementation. Therefore, the Hi-P International Ltd. 
example illustrates two important facts: first, workers in regions that display economic 
growth do engage in protests and strikes; and second, they protest in large part due to 
the perception they have of this economic growth, and the relative slight they feel 
coming from the companies employing them, which have been enjoying the benefits of 
this economic growth. In this case, the Hi-P workers felt entitled to a certain treatment 
by their company, especially upon being laid off, and when they did not receive the just 
treatment they felt they deserved, they protested. Now, let us turn our attention to 
Shanghai.  
 Shanghai has thrived economically, as we have learned, but there has also been a 
downside to this success. The standard of living remains incredibly high in areas with 
prospering economies, especially Shanghai. By taking this particular reality into 
account, it logically follows that the prospect of being unfairly laid off threatens the 
livelihoods of workers, just as the above incident illustrates. However, besides having 
their livelihoods threatened by the possibility of losing their jobs, workers also have 
become aware of the economic success surrounding them, and this perception has led 
them to acquire a sense of entitlement to a certain level and quality of treatment by their 
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employers. For both these reasons, discontent has arisen among members of the 
workforce, and they have chosen to engage in strikes and protests as a means of 
preserving their livelihoods and the level of treatment they have become accustomed to. 
Workers within the Hi-P electronics factory have suffered, and this suffering has 
occurred despite the economic success of the rest of the Shanghai region. Additionally, 
Hurst’s claim that “things could hardly be more different for Shanghai workers”87 when 
comparing unemployment with Liaoning, a region displaying low economic growth, is 
not an accurate in telling what has actually been occurring in Shanghai. I will note here 
that Liaoning’s industrial dynamic presents a completely different one than Shanghai’s. 
Old steel and petrochemical plants heavily populate Liaoning. The dynamic of these 
industries differs dramatically from that of Shanghai, especially when we consider the 
relatively recent emergence of the electronics industry in China.  However, in order to 
realize this fact it becomes imperative to focus our analysis within Shanghai’s 
occupational sectors – particularly the electronics industry. As an overall region, 
Liaoning may be suffering higher unemployment rates than Shanghai, but when we 
examine Shanghai’s electronics industry specifically we see that workers have been 
protesting low wages, unemployment and lack of compensation for unfair layoffs. In 
addition, these electronics employees have blamed their managers – not market reform 
policies – for irresponsibly handling the issues of low wages, unfair layoffs and 
improper compensation upon dismissal. To illustrate these points further, I will now 
highlight some relevant and interesting facts about the particular company in question: 
Hi-P International Ltd. 
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 First, a very large number of workers have been reported as being involved in 
this strike. Some reports have alleged that as many as 1,000 employees actively 
participated in the incident, which occurred on December 2, 2011, making this anything 
but a small strike. Perhaps this makes more sense when we realize that Hi-P 
International Ltd. represents one of Asia’s largest contract manufacturing companies. 
They currently have factories in Tianjin, Qingdao, Chengdu, Suzhou, Dongguan, 
Xiamen, as well as plans to open up more factories in the future. On its corporate 
website, Hi-P International Ltd. highlights their treatment towards their employees:  
“Hi- P is a people’s and results--oriented employer that rewards and empowers our 
people to maximize their potential”.88 In addition to promoting the way they treat their 
employees, Hi-P also emphasize their global presence, achievements, and production 
rate. Having been enlightened to these facts, it becomes difficult to comprehend why a 
company that prides itself in the aforementioned aspects of business could, in reality, be 
treating their workforce so poorly.  
One possible answer may be found in the sheer size of Hi-P International Ltd. 
As such a large electronics company, with massive production units, it seems plausible 
that they could hide employee mistreatment beneath the façade of overall economic 
success as a business. It seems logical to assume that less scrutiny would be given to a 
company with an exceptional business record – especially one located within a region 
whose overall economy continues to prosper and succeed. Therefore, Hurst’s 
scholarship emerges “correct” when considered specifically at the regional level; 
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88 Hi-P International Limited. 2005. Web. 27 Feb 2012. <http://www.hi-p.com/>. 	  
	  	   87	  
and every industry or occupational sector. However, when we do focus our analysis 
deeper, looking specifically within the region’s occupational sectors, we begin to see 
protests occurring, particularly within the electronics industry. This remains a very 
important fact to consider, regardless of the region’s overall economic success. 
However, the location of this particular Hi-P factory may be the real reason the incident 
ended up being reported.  
Since Shanghai continues to be a prospering region, workers employed there 
may be more “in touch” and aware of their situation(s) than somewhere else, the reason 
being that with a generally higher level of technology standard throughout the region, 
workers have more ways to stay updated about their surrounding environment, and this 
includes the success that their employing company may be experiencing, both within 
and outside of the region where they find themselves working. It follows, therefore, that 
workers may be aware of what goes on outside their company and also realize when 
they have been receiving inadequate or unfair treatment. Last, I will add that the 
establishment of Hi-P. can be seen as a direct result of Shanghai’s economic success. 
How well this company does directly benefits the region; however, when workers do 
not feel that they have benefited equally, they express their discontent. In other words, a 
thriving economy can create more displeasure because workers witness this success but 
may fail to reap any of the rewards. Workers perceive how well an area does and when 
they do not thrive in parallel to their peers and company, they question their individual 
success. Therefore, if a company’s production rates remain high, workers will hear 
about it and wonder why their wages remain so low. When workers do not receive 
adequate compensation for their long hours, in light of knowing how well their 
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company has been doing, they begin to wonder why they have not also been invited to 
share in the success and prosperity.  
 Although many of the facts I have just illustrated pertaining to this particular 
electronics industry in Shanghai seem specific to the region, they actually may be 
specific to the electronics industries within regions that display high economic growth. 
My research has uncovered a very specific trend within the electronics industry in 
economically booming areas. Now that we have highlighted a region that Hurst has 
taken into consideration, I would like to turn our attention to Jiangsu and Guangdong. 
We will first consider Jiangsu, where my research has shown that the electronics sector 
there has also been suffering discontent amongst the workforce. Jiangsu, like Shanghai, 
has been displaying high economic growth. In addition to displaying high economic 
growth, this region, like Shanghai has also been receiving a large amount of media 
attention pertaining to workers discontent.  
  
II. A Sectoral Analysis of Jiangsu  
 Jiangsu has been an economic hotspot since the late 1970s. The China 
Perspective reports that Jiangsu’s GDP has grown 12.70% in the past year and predicts 
that this growth will only continue.89 However, when we probe into Jiangsu’s 
electronics sector we see a similar story to the one we already witnessed with the Hi-P 
International incident, namely a workforce that has been suffering from low wages and 
unfair treatment in light of being a large, Sino-foreign joint enterprise.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
89 Looking to surge ahead on its path of growth, the province plans to triple R&D expenditure and double 
railway coverage by 2015. Additionally, the province will devote more focus to high tech, emerging 
industries and service industries. The province hopes to have a prosperous solar industry by 2012, with an 
estimated valued of 100 billion RMB. Jin,Tony, Helen Zhao, and et al. The China Perspective. 27 Feb 
2012. Web. 28 Feb 2012. 
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b. A Glance at Jiangsu’s Electronics sector  
 Nanjing, located along the lower Yangtze River, represents one of China’s most 
important cities. It has been recognized as one of the Four Great Ancient Capitals of 
China and remains a popular tourist attraction for its rich Chinese culture. In addition to 
being known as a tourist hotspot, Nanjing has also been deemed one of China’s most 
important economic zones. Within the past 10 years, many well-known electronics 
manufacturers have begun to set up factories in Nanjing; LG happens to be one of these 
companies. However, particular to this specific sector, workers from LG have begun 
protesting recently within the past year for reasons similar to those cited previously by 
workers at Hi-P International Ltd. My research has uncovered a specific trend within 
the electronics sector.  
 On December 26, 8,000 Chinese workers went on strike at a Nanjing LG 
factory, protesting against alleged unfair treatment by Korean managers.90 China Labor 
Watch reported a description of the strike as the following:  
 The strike on December 26 started with the workers assembling on the factory 
 complex’s athletics field after walking off the job. Initially, only the workers 
 from the number four factory building took part in the demonstration, but they 
 were soon joined by workers from the complex’s four other factory buildings. 
 Before long, the protest had completely shut down approximately 80 different 
 assembly lines.91 
  
 When reporters asked for clarification as to the main cause of the protest, 
Chinese workers replied that they had been discriminated against in their year-end 
bonuses. Specifically, while the Korean assembly line workers received individual year-	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
90 See Report 71. 
91 Qiang, Li. "8000 Workers on Strike at LG Nanjing Factory to Protest Racial Discrimination in Year-
End Bonuses." China Labor Watch. (2011): Web. 27 Feb. 2012.  
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end bonuses equivalent to 6 months’ salary, Chinese assembly line workers received 
individual bonuses equivalent to one month’s salary. When a reporter asked a Chinese 
assembly line worker why he had decided to strike, he replied that he worked just as 
hard as the other workers, and so he saw no reason why he should have received a year-
end bonus any different from his fellow assembly line workers of Korean descent. The 
report goes on to state that after the strike on December 26, factory owners made an 
offer to double the year-end bonuses to two months’ salary, but the Chinese workers 
immediately rejected it. The keen, perceptive nature demonstrated by the Chinese 
assembly line workers, essentially allowing them to realize that they had no reason not 
to expect (or deserve) equal treatment and compensation for doing the exact same work 
as their fellow Korean co-workers, becomes a critical point to take away from this 
particular incident. When reporters asked about additional problems, workers 
responded:  
 According to the workers, the factory has played host to several smaller strikes 
 in the past, owing to the poor treatment workers have suffered over the years. 
 The factory makes severe demands on its workers, often requiring them to  work 
 for as many as 12 hours a day. Many workers can’t take the strain of these  long 
 hours and are forced to resign. Despite workers working for up to 290 hours a 
 month, their monthly salary is never  higher than 2700 RMB (approximately 
 $430).  Finally, the food in the dining hall food is bland and not very filling 
 or nutritious.92 
 
Therefore, not only should LG be faulted for discriminating against their workers, but 
also for overworking and not offering fair compensation to their workers for these extra 
hours. It should not be surprising then, after learning of these different issues, that these 
workers chose to band together and protest against the unfair treatment they had been 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
92 Qiang, Li. "8000 Workers on Strike at LG Nanjing Factory to Protest Racial Discrimination in Year-
End Bonuses." China Labor Watch. (2011): Web. 27 Feb. 2012.  	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receiving. However, to go a step further in understanding this particular strike, I would 
also like to highlight some important characteristics of LG as a company, similarly to 
the way I examined Hi-P International Ltd.  
 Like Hi-P, the Nanjing LG Electronics factory represents another private Sino-
foreign joint enterprise. LG bases its operations out of Korea, but this particular factory 
happens to be joint-owned by China and Korea. In addition to the Nanjing LG 
Electronics factory being a Sino-foreign joint enterprise, it also represents one of the 
largest in China. As we found the case likely to be for the Hi-P International strike, with 
a large company and factory, the size of the strike often grows accordingly. As stated 
previously, 8,000 Chinese workers from this LG Electronics factory participated in the 
December strike. In fact, this represented one of the largest strikes I documented in my 
database. Further similarity exists between the Hi-P International case and the LG 
Electronics one, as the Nanjing manufacturing hub had also been succeeding from a 
business standpoint. China Labor Watch illustrates the company’s economic success,  
 The Nanjing factory manufactures LCD TVs, LED TVs and computer monitors 
 for the LG Display Corporation, a subsidiary of the LG Group (KRX: 003550). 
 The LG Group is a conglomerate of electronics, plastics and chemical 
 manufacturers that was founded in 1947 in South Korea. By 2011, it had annual 
 revenues of $48.24 billion and was South Korea’s second largest conglomerate, 
 behind Samsung.93 
 
By shedding light on this particular factory’s overall economic success, we return once 
again to the question: why have electronics companies like Hi-P International and LG, 
whose economic successes have been well-documented, continued to treat their 
employees poorly? The answer seems to lie in the essential fact that (these) electronics 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
93 Qiang, Li. "8000 Workers on Strike at LG Nanjing Factory to Protest Racial Discrimination in Year-
End Bonuses." China Labor Watch. (2011): Web. 27 Feb. 2012.  
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companies remain often, if not always Sino-foreign joint owned and private enterprises. 
The “private enterprise” designation affords these companies the legal breathing room 
they need to effectively circumvent the national laws that would require proper 
treatment of their employees. And in some cases, as the Nanjing LG Electronics 
incident illustrates, they can also get away with discrimination. Also, we may see more 
protesting within this industry because the electronics sector happens to be incredibly 
time-sensitive. Because the majority of these companies remain export-oriented, they 
often find themselves forced to stick to tight, specific schedules with regards to 
completing shipments and orders. Operating within one of the most time-sensitive 
industries, electronics factories demand more hours in harsher working conditions to 
complete orders promptly and on time. However, the Chinese workers’ rejection of the 
company’s feeble, half-hearted attempt to alleviate the situation remains another 
important aspect of this protest worthy of our recognition and attention. Because 
doubling Chinese workers’ year-end bonuses still did not equal the bonuses given to the 
Korean workers, these workers completely rejected the company’s “compromise” 
proposal. These Chinese workers demonstrated the simple fact that employees 
everywhere, especially those who remain aware of their situations and perceptive to 
unfair treatment, expect to be treated both fairly and equally for the time and effort they 
put into their jobs.  
 Guangdong will be the final region taken into consideration by this section. In 
the third chapter, we probed micro-regionally to shed light on the diverse nature of 
protests occurring within this region. When we looked at Guangdong’s more urban 
areas we found that Guangdong has suffered from several different issues, all stemming 
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from the inability of the managerial level to properly implement labor laws. In fact, 
when we considered the city of Shenzhen, we found that the Jingmo Electronics factory 
had been the recent target of a strike by its workers. However, Jingmo Electronics does 
not stand alone among Guangdong’s many factories that have suffered from employee 
mass protesting. The next section will take a closer look at Guangdong, but this time we 
will be looking specifically at the electronics sector operating within the region.  
 
III. A Sectoral Analysis of Guangdong  
 Guangdong represents another region, similar to Shanghai and Jiangsu, which 
has thrived economically over the course of the past five years as a result of the plethora 
of Sino-foreign joint enterprises operating within its borders. Guangdong sits atop both 
trade lists – exports and imports – for the country. Just last year, Guangdong’s GDP had 
grown 12.40%.94 However, also following in the analyses we have seen for Shanghai 
and Jiangsu, when we probe into Guangdong we see there has been a substantial amount 
of discontent among the workforce in its electronics sector.  
 
c. A Glance at Guangdong’s Electronics industry  
 As stated in the previous chapter, Shenzhen represents one of Guangdong’s 
larger cities. This particular region happens to be heavily populated by electronics 
industry manufacturers. However, while the region does well overall, the economics 
sector seems to be suffering. Sanyo Electric Co., Ltd., one company operating within 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
94 Guangdong has also led the way in moving up the manufacturing value chain from light industry 
production of textiles, toys and shoes to high end manufacturing of things like IT products and power 
equipment. Even as strong as Guangdong's manufacturing economy is Guangdong's local government 
expects the service industry to account for over 50% of GDP by 2015 and high tech manufacturing 
another 20%. Jin, Tony, Helen Zhao, and et al. The China Perspective. 27 Feb 2012. Web. 28 Feb 2012. 
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the region, represents one company that has had the misfortune of turning up in news 
reports, having seen two mass protests within the past year. 
 On November 9, 2011 more than 1,000 Sanyo workers protested against poor 
working conditions and a planned merger with another company within Shenzhen.95 
The company manager told workers that if they did not comply they would be fired 
immediately. The article also stated that workers had engaged in protest for the 
following additional reasons, 
 Workers complained that after the company increased basic salaries to 1,100 
 yuan per month this year, inline with Shenzhen's new minimum wage, it 
 quadrupled the cost of food in the staff canteen. Workers said they could earn 
 around 2,000 yuan a month before the tax but the company's social security and 
 medical insurance contributions were still calculated according to the previous 
 basic wage. 96 
 
Workers cited three primary reasons for their protest: costly working conditions; a 
planned, but forced merger with another company; and low wages. The article shows 
that company managers told workers that after the merger workers would be more 
content with working conditions and salary, but the article does not further illustrate 
how many of these workers elected to comply with the merger. With the first case in 
mind, let us now turn our attention to Sanyo’s second protest, which occurred in 
January.  
 On January 16, 2012, 4,000 workers at the Sanyo Electric plant in Shenzhen 
engaged in a strike against the lack of compensation and job security that came as a 
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  See	  Report	  66.	  
96 "Sanyo Workers in Shenzhen Stage Strike." China Labor Bulletin. (2011): Web. 27 Feb. 2012. 
<http://www.clb.org.hk/en/node/100927>. 	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result after the merger with Panasonic Corp.97 The article goes on to illustrate the 
details of the protest,  
 Employees were notified of the plan to merge with another company but not told 
 about the official takeover until late last week. No compensation offer was 
 made for their years working under the previous employer. This in turn 
 affected their pensions and medical benefits. Workers pointed out that when 
 Sanyo Motors, as well as the nearby Siemens factory, were taken over, 
 employees were compensated for their years of service before being 
 reemployed by the new owners.98 
 
Lack of compensation, as well as the workers’ awareness of the resulting treatment of 
employees following another recent company merger, seemed to be the leading sources 
of discontent for this particular incident. A few aspects of these two protests require our 
attention and bear noting as important. First, these articles highlight a protest before 
Sanyo’s plan to merge as well as a protest following Sanyo’s merger with Panasonic. 
Therefore, it can reasonably be assumed that discontent existed among the workforce 
before the merger, and then did not subside, or perhaps even worsened after the merger 
became official. Second, it remains somewhat alarming that Panasonic made no offer of 
compensation to the employees for their prior years of service to Sanyo once the merger 
became official. And third, it should be noted that workers had been aware of another 
company that had recently gone through with a merger, which had offered 
compensation and fair treatment to its workers following the business union, and they 
questioned why they had not been treated the same way. Having now discussed some of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  97	  See	  Report	  89.	  
98 Yee, Lee, and Isabel Reynolds. "Thousands of workers protest at Sanyo's China plant." Reuters (Hong 
Kong) 16 Jan 2012, Web. 27 Feb. 2012. <http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/01/16/us-china-protest-
idUSTRE80F0FR20120116?feedType=RSS&feedName=businessNews&utm_source=feedburner&utm_
medium=feed&utm_campaign=Feed>. 
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the particularly important factors surrounding the workers and their strike, we can focus 
our attention more squarely on Sanyo Electronic. Co., Ltd.   
 Japanese based Sanyo Electric Co., Ltd represents one of the largest electronics 
manufacturing companies in the world. On December 21, 2009, Panasonic completed a 
multibillion-dollar deal which made Sanyo a subsidiary of Panasonic. In Mainland 
China, Sanyo currently has thirteen different electronic factories, four of which operate 
within the region of Guangdong. The other nine factories operate within Dalian 
Liaoning. With thirteen manufacturing locations in Mainland China, Sanyo Electric 
clearly has substantial reach and size as a company, much like Hi-P International and 
LG Electronics. And like the other two electronics manufacturers, Sanyo operates as a 
Sino-foreign joint enterprise, and it does a significant amount of its production work in 
both Guangdong and Liaoning. The sheer size of both the November and the more 
recent January protest at this Sanyo factory also stand as being incredibly large for a 
single factory, with more than 1,000 workers involved in the first, and more than 4,000 
involved in the second protest.  
Although workers had not been protesting against uncompensated or 
unreasonable overtime hours in these specific cases, like we saw with the Shanghai 
transportation industry workers, the electronics industry continues the trend in 
highlighting how workers may become discontent in spite of the economic growth that 
certain regions display. Illustrating this point, like Hi-P’s and LG’s workers, Sanyo’s 
workers have become discontent because of a perception of how they feel they ought to 
be treated in an environment where the economy and their respective companies have 
continued to thrive. In other words, these workers feel that the treatment they receive 
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from their employers should reflect the economic strides being made overall, and they 
have resorted to engaging in strikes and protests when they feel their contributions have 
not been rewarded or recognized appropriately. When we specifically consider the 
Sanyo Electrics case, we understand that these employees believed that following the 
merger with Panasonic, they should have been compensated and treated the same way 
they had been treated as employees prior to the merger, as well as receiving treatment 
equal to their peer workers elsewhere within the electronics industry in the region. 
Therefore, this case illustrates that workers’ discontent may be looked at as relative to 
how others have been treated upon a company’s merge; because workers from another 
company had been compensated for a year’s worth of wages, the Sanyo’s workers 
expected to be treated accordingly.  
  
IV. The Significance of Looking at the Electronics Sector 
 After considering each region’s electronics industry in addition to specific cases 
of protest it becomes clear that workers in Shanghai, Jiangsu, and Guangdong have 
become more perceptive with regards to their region’s economic achievements in light 
of their current situations of unfair treatment. Workers pay attention to the output 
numbers for production because they work such long, grueling hours to ensure they 
make their shipments and quotas, so it makes sense that when they run into 
compensation issues, but they remain aware of the success the company has continued 
to enjoy, they become agitated by the perceived absence of benefits they feel entitled to, 
having been a part of that overall success. Although this chapter has only considered 
three electronics manufacturers in the regions of Shanghai, Jiangsu, and Guangdong, 
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some important facts have become apparent as to why this specific occupational sector 
has seen repeated protesting within regions with stable, successful economies.  
 First, the companies whose factories have been victimized by workers striking 
have been private Sino-foreign joint enterprises. The second chapter of this thesis 
explained why the existence of private enterprises in China came with both positive and 
negative ramifications. The government can control state-owned enterprises by 
enforcing new labor laws and policies, but privately owned Sino-foreign joint 
enterprises have found ways to circumvent labor laws and policies, since they do not 
answer to or operate directly within the national government’s control. In fact, these 
enterprises have little motivating them to obey national labor laws since these laws and 
policies often pose obstacles to the bottom lines or profit margins being sought by the 
companies.  
Second, Hi-P International Ltd., LG Electronics, and Sanyo Electric represent 
incredibly large electronics industry companies that manufacture products within China 
and service products around the world. In other words, if these companies had smaller 
global economic footprints, their incidents of strike would likely have never made such 
big splashes in the media. Furthermore, as big players in the global electronics industry, 
these companies have certain reputations to uphold. We learned earlier in this chapter 
the Hi-P takes significant pride in the way its treatment of employees has been 
perceived. Ironically, the recent incidents of collective action involving their company’s 
factories would suggest that they do not actually treat their employees with the due 
diligence and good will that they have promoted.  
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Last, each of these companies’ factories have been achieving great success 
within regions whose own economies have displayed economic growth overall. 
Essentially, these companies contribute to the success of their region(s). By highlighting 
these three similarities among companies within the electronics sector, it becomes 
clearer why workers within these companies have continued to suffer poor treatment, 
even in the face of economic growth and success. As a result of the success being 
enjoyed by these thriving regions, protests such as the two I have just explored have 
managed to go unnoticed.  
Shanghai presents an excellent example with which to test Hurst’s political 
economy argument. Hurst’s scholarship remains correct in that Shanghai displays 
economic growth as a region, as it has not been known to be a frequency victim of 
protesting as a region. However, like the basic regional argument presented by C.K. 
Lee, Hurst’s argument stays too broad-minded by remaining focused at the regional 
level, because delving into specific occupational sectors we do see repeated accounts of 
protesting and strikes. Although I have only highlighted one instance of protest within 
Shanghai’s electronics industry, my database illustrates that there had been an 
additional protest within this specific area in the past year.99 And when we consider 
Jiangsu, a region that has also displayed economic growth, there have been many 
protests occurring within this particular sector, as well. Although this chapter has only 
considered one incident, at LG Electronics, within Jiangsu’s electronics sector, like 
Shanghai, there have also been multiple cases of documented discontent among 
electronic workers in this region.100 Like Shanghai and Jiangsu, Guangdong also 	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displays other cases of protest within this sector. However, Guangdong has shown a 
higher rate of protest within this industry.101  
One additional question pertaining to the electronics industry, which has not 
been considered yet, remains: why have foreign enterprises chosen to established 
business in China? It would seem that we find the answer in the unrivaled cheap labor 
to be found by operating within China’s borders. The importance of this particular 
aspect remains specific to an industry that requires its workers to work long overtime 
hours, since electronics industry companies must ensure that they can work their 
employees for long periods of time, including overtime, while still producing materials 
at cheap costs. The reality is that workers, especially when they work such long, 
grueling hours, become discontent if they do not feel they have been compensated fairly 
for their efforts. Labor costs can only stay cheap at the workers’ expense, but once they 
figure this out the most likely scenario and reaction, which has been illustrated by the 
reports in my database, has been to engage in collective action to fight for their rights.  
After considering all of the facts these two cases have illustrated, one can likely 
assume that Hurst and similar scholars have not examined these protests because they 
simply have not come up under such a broad method of analysis as a region’s political 
economy. In addition, China does a very thorough job covering up these incidents, so 
when they do occur the stories disappear from the media almost immediately. However, 
the massive number of workers involved in both the Hi-P International and the LG 
Electronics strike made it very difficult for the Chinese government to suppress media 
coverage. Especially when we consider that one employee from the LG Electronics 
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strike managed to upload a video to the internet, in which claimed, “By the strike’s end, 
they won’t just be giving us polite answers to our uncompromised proposals. United we 
are strong and we will persevere until we are victorious,” it becomes very difficult to 
believe companies when they claim that these incidents never occurred.  
 Taking into account all of these important dimensions of the electronics sector 
and the repeated protests that have occurred recently, it may be a good time to 
reconsider how well we deem China’s “economically successful” regions to be doing. 
The main objective of this last chapter involved shedding light on two regions with 
prospering economies in light of Hurst’s political economy argument. After examining 
Shanghai, which surfaced in Hurst’s scholarship, as well as Jiangsu, a region I have 
studied closely, it has become apparent that a region’s economic success can actually be 
an underlying reason for workers protesting. Simply by witnessing and being a part of 
this overall economic achievement, when workers do not feel like they have been 
allowed to share in the benefits of the success they often become agitated and turn to 
protesting to voice their discontent. When we consider Liaoning, Hurst makes an 
exceptional point by shedding light on the fact that this specific region has been 
dramatically affected by market form; however, this theory cannot be applied to regions 
that have not been affected by market reform in the same ways that Liaoning had. Also, 
a region’s GDP cannot always help understand why certain industrial sectors are 
protesting within an economically booming region. To do this, we must actually take 
the time to look at the individual occupational sectors, and only then can we begin to 
understand they might be protesting when the region seems to be doing just fine. At this 
specific sectoral level, trends become clear and the reader can effectively identify the 
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main problem, which for this case happens to be that workers have been slaving away 
without benefiting in line with the profits being made by their companies.  
By remaining loyal to their companies and not complaining, as the workers of 
Hi-P and LG had been doing, they suffered from inadequate compensation, low wages, 
and discrimination by co-workers, all because the government had been unable to 
enforce newly established labor policies that would have protected them. While the 
problems facing workers within the electronics sector may cover a broad range of 
maltreatment issues, the only way to decipher the underlying problem in most cases 
remains taking a close look within the occupational sectors of each region, no matter 
what the overall economic outlook for it may be. 
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Chapter Five: 
Conclusion 
  
 The world has become increasingly more aware of China’s vast economic 
achievements. However, in light of its economic success many have also learned about 
the significant number of demonstrations of collective action that have been plaguing 
the country. Scholars have utilized a regional method when analyzing China’s collective 
action issue, whose incidents have been growing in frequency. C.K. Lee, one such 
scholar who has done significant research on two of China’s regions, argues that both 
Liaoning and Guangdong have suffered from protests because of the establishment of 
new market reform policies within China. This method has proven helpful because it 
illustrates that these protests do not strictly remain confined to one area of China, but 
rather in two vastly different regions. According to C.L Lee, it also allows the reader to 
see that the reasons for protesting demonstrations vary greatly across different regions. 
Workers in Liaoning have grown distraught over low wages (and in some cases even 
nonexistent wages), while workers in Guangdong have cited the inability to retrieve 
their pensions as a main reason for discontent. However, after we considered C.K. Lee’s 
scholarship, we found that certain limitations arose concerning the scope of her 
argument.  
C.K. Lee’s research emphasized many significant factors to the gradual uprising 
of collective action in China, but her main message focused on the ways in which 
China’s market reform era has impacted both urban and rural areas of China. 
Subsequently, she proposed that the discontent that has followed has been a result of 
market reforms and the various policies associated therein. More specifically, C.K. Lee 
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has formulated two arguments. On one level C.K. Lee has viewed specific regions in 
light of the 1980s market reform and how they were affected. On a more specific level 
she has considered Guangdong and Liaoning, two areas that have been affected by 
market reform alternations. She has then claimed that Guangdong suffers from unpaid 
pension and Liaoning suffers from unemployment and unpaid wages. Although C.K. 
Lee’s insight has been helpful in highlighting the broader, more comprehensive 
reasoning behind protesting, she does at times remain too broadminded and even 
abstract when it comes to the reasoning behind social discontent. In other words, she 
considers one region and gives a very broad explanation as to why workers have 
become discontent. As significant as C.K. Lee’s scholarship has been to the field of 
collective action, I refuse to accept that there may be just one explanation for all the 
protesting going on in China. 
My research has differed from C.K. Lee in that I have considered the urban 
cities of regions as the focus of my studies, instead of taking a macro-regional approach 
as C.K. Lee has done with Guangdong. When we probed into Guangdong’s inner cities 
of Foshan, Guangzhou, Shenzhen, and Dongguan, we found that workers’ discontent 
did not necessarily stem from market reform policies as C.K. Lee has claimed, but 
rather with the ways that the governmental and managerial level have poorly enforced 
these policies. More specifically, my database has illustrated that managers have not 
been implementing policies correctly and as a result workers have suffered and begun 
voicing this discontent through protest. Finally, my research has shown that the 
dynamic of Chinese protesting has changed since C.K. Lee began conducting her 
research from the late 1990s into the early 2000s. Lee retained some accuracy in her 
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analysis by concluding that Guangdong has suffered significantly from the new market 
reform policies during the early and late 90s and even in the beginning of the 2000s; 
however, present day Guangdong workers have not continued to suffer exactly the same 
way that they did when these reforms initially went into effect.  
 After considering the micro-regional level, it becomes apparent that the source 
of workers’ discontent has become both diverse and multilayered. By mistakenly 
attributing generalized causes of discontent such as pension payments to the region, we 
blind ourselves from the reality – the intricate, specific details of what has been going 
on in Guangdong. When we view Guangdong through the micro-regional scope that I 
have proposed, we see that workers have actually had the opportunity to benefit greatly 
from the aforementioned reforms, but discontent has arisen where policies have not 
been implemented properly and managers have cheated their employees out of these 
potential benefits.  
 William Hurst, like C.K. Lee, also takes a regional approach when analyzing 
workforce discontent; however, his main argument states that the reader must take into 
consideration a region’s political economy, or its economic stability, in order to 
understand discontent among workers. In other words, if a region had been doing poorly 
from an economic perspective, then Hurst would consider the region’s struggling 
economy to be the primary source of its workers’ discontent. We then learned that this 
method has been helpful because it allows the reader to become familiar with how well 
China has been doing economically, as well as what areas have continued to flourish 
more than others. For example, when we considered the difference between the political 
economies of Liaoning and Shanghai, we found it to be immense and noteworthy of 
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highlighting when considering collective action in both regions. While Shanghai has 
continued to be a region of prosperity and opportunity, Liaoning remains an area where 
opportunity does not abound on quite the same level, and protests may result directly 
from this lack of opportunity. Hurst adds to C.K. Lee’s argument by highlighting the 
importance of the political economy of an area, but Hurst and C.K. Lee both remain too 
broad in their arguments. While I do agree with Hurst on the importance of considering 
political economies when examining protests, Shanghai remains a very large region, one 
with many districts and cities, and although its overall GDP has continued to boom, not 
every type of worker, across every occupation, has reflected that same level of success.  
 My research has shown that there lies significant discontent even within China’s 
more prosperous regions. In order to see this dynamic, we must consider a region’s 
occupational sectors. Specifically, this paper has considered the electronics industries 
within three of China’s economically burgeoning regions: Shanghai, Jiangsu, and 
Guangdong. When we considered different cases of protest within the electronics 
industries in these three regions, we found that significant trends emerged. First, all of 
the electronics firms we considered presented examples of large factories as the target 
locations for each protest. Second, each case involved a company whose factory 
represented a Sino-foreign joint enterprise. And last, since we had been considering 
factories within the electronics industry, the work being done in each remained 
incredibly time-sensitive, meaning deadlines for production and shipments had to be 
met, regardless of the cost to the livelihoods of the workers doing the job. When we 
consider these three aspects of the electronics sector, we realize these particular facets 
make companies in this specific industry much more inclined to mistreat their workers. 
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However, not only has this paper illustrated that protests have in fact been occurring in 
economically booming regions, but it has also shed light on workers’ underlying 
reasons for engaging in protests and strikes. When we considered three cases within 
China’s economically flourishing regions, we found that workers had been comparing 
their own economic success to their peers as well as their companies. For instance, 
when we considered a strike in Jiangsu’s LG Electronics factory, we found that a 
Chinese worker had become discontent not necessarily because he had not received a 
proper year-end bonus, but more so because his bonus had not been as high as his 
Korean co-worker. This subjective perspective retains its significance and needs to be 
taken into consideration in order to understand why workers have actually become 
upset. Therefore, Hurst’s more objective viewpoint may enlighten a reader as to why a 
region has not seemed to be protesting overall. However, the problem arises when a 
specific case has been highlighted within a “non-protest-prone” region, such as the three 
cases mentioned earlier in this paper, and his argument fails to make sense of these 
specific incidents. My research has shown that workers, especially within the 
electronics sector, have become discontent because they have been able to perceive their 
companies’ success, as well as their peers’, and they have begun to wonder why their 
own level of prosperity has not occurred on quite the same level as either.  
 Utilizing both a micro-regional and a sectoral approach has proven significant in 
my study of collective action in China. As I illustrated with Guangdong, there have 
been many cases of protest occurring within China’s myriad of regions and this 
diversity can only be noticed when probing into the regions’ cities. This diversity 
highlights that the nature of these protests cannot be deemed as generalized as scholars 
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have made it seem thus far. My research has also highlighted that serious 
implementation issues exist at the managerial level. Correct implementation remains 
vital to the success of growing companies. My sectoral hypothesis has been equally 
significant. As China becomes more of a capitalist country, workers mindsets will be 
sure to alter accordingly. The discontent that has arisen as a result of workers’ 
perceptions of personal success will only grow more frequent as this capitalist mindset 
becomes more common. I hope that future research will follow this path of analysis. 
Watching China’s economic growth from an objective standpoint may be important, but 
considering a region’s workers from a subjective standpoint should be deemed equally 
as important. Discontent stems from how one feels, and while statistics may help us see 
part of the picture, they should not be used by themselves – perceptions should not be 
forgotten.  
 Unfortunately, I had a limited time with which to gather data and conduct my 
research for the project. For my micro-regional argument, I was only able to focus on a 
few of Guangdong’s urban cities. Future research should delve further into regions by 
exploring their more urbanized areas and cities. In addition to Guangdong, I found that 
Liaoning and Zhejiang both showed significant diversity at their city-levels. However, I 
was not able to cover both of these regions in this paper due to time constraints. In the 
past two years, Zhejiang and Liaoning have been altered significantly. Liaoning’s and 
Zhejiang’s inner cities have become more and more populated by various factories and 
firms. The vast diversity shown in these two regions would probably prove more 
significant than Guangdong’s. I would hope that future research would take this 
direction and continue to further explore regions in light of their urban cities.  
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 For my sectoral argument I only had the ability to focus on one of China’s 
occupational sectors – the electronics sector. Further research should attempt to give my 
argument more applicability within economically burgeoning regions by focusing on a 
smaller occupational sector, one not so predominated by Sino-foreign joint enterprises, 
and one whose general work did not remain so time- sensitive. However, I still feel that 
both my micro-regional argument and my sectoral argument remain crucial aspects to 
take into consideration when researching China’s collective action. The dynamic of 
protests throughout the country remains in a constant state of flux, and this trend will 
surely continue as China becomes more export-oriented.  
 This research may not only be important to China’s workforce, but also to the 
longevity of the country’s economic growth. LG, Sanyo, and Hi-P each represent large, 
Sino-foreign joint enterprises that have chosen to establish their manufacturing firms in 
China because the location allows them to make their products cheaply and efficiently. 
While these three aforementioned cases have not yet begun to disrupt China’s economic 
order, if China’s government and managerial officials cannot find a way to satisfy their 
workers, the likelihood remains that these protests will continue to grow to the point 
that they do significantly affect the country’s overall economic growth rate. 
Specifically, these protests will eventually begin to affect the way that China interacts 
as a member of these Sino-foreign joint enterprises. In other words, as a result of this 
contention, businesses, factories, and firms will begin to look elsewhere to manufacture 
their goods. Alternatively, the more Sino-foreign joint enterprises establish themselves 
within China and continue to make the country more export-oriented, the more we may 
see this contention emerge and balloon. The possibility remains that, with either of these 
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scenarios, the next 15 years could decide whether or not foreign industries will be able 
to continue to manufacture these goods as cheaply and efficiently as they have up until 
this point. The next 15 years could possibly see the end of cheap labor in China. 
Additionally, as more workers express their dissatisfaction, more workers will 
subsequently feel comfortable voicing their discontent. The emergence and 
strengthening of the collective “worker’s voice” could lead to the democratization of 
China.  
 As of right now, the rest world of the world is becoming increasingly more 
aware of China’s social unrest; however, what is actually aired to the public is very 
selective. Once more protests begin to hit the media, foreign countries are going to 
begin to question China’s treatment towards its people. China has set itself on the right 
path, steering further and further away from socialist values and entering a world of 
commerce, international relations, and market reform; however, this success relies on 
China’s immense workforce population. These workers remain one of the most 
important contributors to the overall success of the country. With so much dependence 
on the support of its citizens, particularly those within the workforce, China has arrived 
at a crossroads of sorts. A country can only move forward with the support of its people. 
If China loses the support of its citizens, it is likely China will have difficulty 
progressing further economically, politically, and socially.  
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Appendix A 
 
  Province City/County Occupation Number of Protesters Source 
1 Zhejiang Jinhua Internet Protest: Animal Abuse n/a http://www.whatsonxiamen.com/news21354.html 
2 Shaanxi Datong Coal Miners  2,000-3,500 http://www.greenleft.org.au/node/25324 
3 Jiangsu Nanjing Electronic Industry Workers  1,000 http://chinastrikes.crowdmap.com/reports/view/136 
4 Hainan  Haikou Factory Workers: Garment Industry 1,000 http://chinastrikes.crowdmap.com/reports/view/170 
5 Guangdong Panyu, Guangzhou Factory Workers: Handbag Industry  4,000+ http://chinastrikes.crowdmap.com/reports/view/143 
6 Sichuan  Emeishan  Factory Workers: Laid Off  1,500 http://chinastrikes.crowdmap.com/reports/view/79 
7 Henan  Xinye County  Fertilizer Workers  500 http://chinastrikes.crowdmap.com/reports/view/83 
8 Guangdong Haizhu District, Guangzhou Sanitation Workers  200+ http://chinastrikes.crowdmap.com/reports/view/75 
9 Shanghai Waigaoqiao  Transportation: Truck Drivers  2,000+ http://chinastrikes.crowdmap.com/reports/view/80 
10 Guangdong Dongguan Transportation: Bus Drivers 26 bus crews http://chinastrikes.crowdmap.com/reports/view/159 
11 Anhui Huaining   Transportation: Bus Drivers n/a http://chinastrikes.crowdmap.com/reports/view/160 
12 Anhui Yuyang  Transportation: Bus Drivers dozens http://chinastrikes.crowdmap.com/reports/view/162 
13 Shaanxi Ankang   
Transportation: 
Bus Drivers two routes http://chinastrikes.crowdmap.com/reports/view/163 
14 Hunan Changsha Transportation: Railway Workers  100+ http://chinastrikes.crowdmap.com/reports/view/152 
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15 Zhejiang  Wenzhou  Transportation: Taxi Drivers 100+ http://chinastrikes.crowdmap.com/reports/view/150 
16 Zhejiang  Hangzhou Transportation: Taxi Drivers 1000+ http://chinastrikes.crowdmap.com/reports/view/148 
17 Shanghai Shanghai Transportation: Taxi Drivers 
Fuxin Taxi 
Company http://chinastrikes.crowdmap.com/reports/view/151 
18 Hainan  Qionghai Transportation: Taxi Drivers 100+ http://chinastrikes.crowdmap.com/reports/view/158 
19 Zhejiang Jiaxin Transportation: Taxi Drivers 
200 out of 900 
cabs 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/08/09/china-strike-
idUSL3E7J92QU20110809 
20 Gansu Lanzhou Transportation: Taxi Drivers 5,000 http://www.greenleft.org.au/node/25324 
21 Henan Zhengzhou Transportation: Taxi Drivers 100+ http://chinastrikes.crowdmap.com/reports/view/157 
22 Shandong Zhangqiu Transportation: Taxi Drivers 100+ http://www.clb.org.hk/en/node/101108 
23 Guangdong Foshan Transportation: Taxi Drivers 
150 drivers 1 
company http://www.clb.org.hk/en/node/101108 
24 Yunnan Mengzi Transportation: Taxi Drivers 
100 drivers 5 
companies http://www.clb.org.hk/en/node/101108 
25 Henan Zhengzhou Transportation: Taxi Drivers 1,000+ http://chinastrikes.crowdmap.com/reports/view/50 
26 Hubei Xianning Transportation: Taxi Drivers 100+ http://chinastrikes.crowdmap.com/reports/view/50 
27 Fujian Fuzhou Transportation: Taxi Drivers n/a http://chinastrikes.crowdmap.com/reports/view/124 
28 Fujian  Putian  Transportation: Taxi Drivers 1,200+ http://chinastrikes.crowdmap.com/reports/view/125 
29 Guizhou Baiyun District, Guiyang Factory Workers: Migrant Workers  1,500+ http://www.greenleft.org.au/node/25324 
30 Guangdong Dongguan Factory Workers: Migrant Workers  
migrant 
workers 
http://www.citizenstrade.org/ctc/wp-
content/uploads/2011/05/knightridder_chineseworkers_09082004.pdf 
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31 Shanghai Main Harbor District Transportation: Truck Drivers  600+ 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/04/22/china-strike-exports-
shanghai-truckers_n_852628.html 
32 Guangdong Tianhe District, Guangzhou Factory Workers: Auto Parts 
200-300 out 
of 800 http://chinastrikes.crowdmap.com/reports/view/24 
33 Guangdong Foshan Factory Workers: Auto Parts  90 out of 200 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2010/07/21/us-china-labour-
idUSTRE66K0WH20100721 
34 Guangdong Nansha, Guangzhou Factory Workers: Auto Parts  1,000+ http://chinastrikes.crowdmap.com/reports/view/22 
35 Wuhan Hubei Factory Workers: Auto Parts  240+ http://chinastrikes.crowdmap.com/reports/view/32 
36 Tianjin Northern City  Factory Workers: Auto Parts  n/a http://chinastrikes.crowdmap.com/reports/view/7 
37 Tianjin Xiqing Economic Development Area 
Factory Workers: 
Auto Parts  1,000+ http://chinastrikes.crowdmap.com/reports/view/21 
38 Tianjin Northern City  Factory Workers: Auto Parts  n/a 
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/business/2010-
06/21/content_9996470.htm 
39 Guangdong Zhongshan Factory Workers: Auto Parts  n/a http://chinastrikes.crowdmap.com/reports/view/8 
40 Guangdong Foshan Factory Workers: Auto Parts  250+ http://chinastrikes.crowdmap.com/reports/view/9 
41 Guangdong Zhongshan Factory Workers: Auto Parts  1,700+ http://chinastrikes.crowdmap.com/reports/view/9 
42 Guangdong Nanhai, Foshan Factory Workers: Auto Parts  n/a http://chinastrikes.crowdmap.com/reports/view/6 
43 Liaoning Dalian 
Petrochemical 
Workers/Chinese 
Civilians  
12,000+ http://library.pressdisplay.com/pressdisplay/viewer.aspx# 
44 Zhejiang Hangzhou Transportation: Taxi Drivers 1,000+ http://library.pressdisplay.com/pressdisplay/viewer.aspx# 
45 Guangdong Dongguan, Huang Jiang Township 
Factory Workers: 
Shoe Industry  7,000+ http://www.clb.org.hk/en/node/101169 
46 Combined city protest  
Chongqing, Chengdu, 
Nanchang, Fuzhou, and 
Changsha  
Factory Workers: 
Bottling Plant 2,000+ http://www.clb.org.hk/en/node/101166 
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47 Fujian Xiamen Transportation: Taxi Drivers 100+ http://www.clb.org.hk/en/node/101156 
48 Guangdong Qiaotou Township Transportation: Taxi Drivers n/a http://www.clb.org.hk/en/node/101156 
49 Anhui Chaohu City Transportation: Taxi Drivers 300+ http://www.clb.org.hk/en/node/101156 
50 Hunan Xiangtan Transportation: Taxi Drivers n/a http://www.clb.org.hk/en/node/101156 
51 Henan  Leihe Transportation: Taxi Drivers 500+ http://www.clb.org.hk/en/node/101156 
52 
Wuhan, Xi'an, 
Yunnan, Lanzhou, 
Anhui 
Kunming (Yunnan), 
Chuzhou (Anhui) 
Transportation: 
Bus Drivers n/a http://www.clb.org.hk/en/node/101156 
53 Shanghai Yangpu District Hospital: Support Staff 500+ https://chinastrikes.crowdmap.com/reports/view/186 
54 Chongqing n/a 
Factory Workers: 
Chemical and 
Fertilizer 
264+ http://www.clb.org.hk/en/node/101169178 
55 Henan Luohe Transportation: Taxi Drivers 1,000+ https://chinastrikes.crowdmap.com/reports/view/184 
56 Guangdong Dongguan Factory Workers; Watch Factory 2,000+ https://chinastrikes.crowdmap.com/reports/view/180 
57 Zhejiang Wenzhou Factory Workers: Eyeglass Industry 2,000+ https://chinastrikes.crowdmap.com/reports/view/185 
58 Jiangsu Nanjing Sanitation Workers  n/a https://chinastrikes.crowdmap.com/reports/view/194 
59 Guangdong Biayun District, Guangzhou Factory Workers: Shoe Industry  300+ https://chinastrikes.crowdmap.com/reports/view/187 
60 Guangdong Shenzhen Factory Workers: Electronics  1,000+ https://chinastrikes.crowdmap.com/reports/view/196 
61 Guangdong Huangjiang Township, Dongguan 
Factory Workers: 
Shoe Industry  7,000+ https://chinastrikes.crowdmap.com/reports/view/193 
62 Guangdong Shenzhen Factory Workers: Garment Industry 400+ https://chinastrikes.crowdmap.com/reports/view/197 
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63 Jiangsu Taicang Factory Workers: Electronics  300+ https://chinastrikes.crowdmap.com/reports/view/207 
64  Shanghai n/a Factory Workers: Electronics  1000+ https://chinastrikes.crowdmap.com/reports/view/206 
65 Zhejiang Anji Factory Workers: Furniture  100+ https://chinastrikes.crowdmap.com/reports/view/214 
66 Guangdong Shenzhen Factory Workers: Electronics  1000+ https://chinastrikes.crowdmap.com/reports/view/58 
67 Hainan  Haikou Transportation: Truck Drivers  n/a https://chinastrikes.crowdmap.com/reports/view/209 
68 Guangxi Haikou Transportation: Truck Drivers  n/a https://chinastrikes.crowdmap.com/reports/view/209 
69 Henan Fangchang Transportation: Truck Drivers  n/a http://www.clb.org.hk/en/node/101187 
70 Zhejiang Jinhua Supermarket 100+ https://chinastrikes.crowdmap.com/reports/view/200 
71 Jiangsu Nanjing Electronic Industry Workers  8,000 https://chinastrikes.crowdmap.com/reports/view/219 
72 Guangdong Guangzhou Factory Workers: Auto Parts  2,000 https://chinastrikes.crowdmap.com/reports/view/220 
73 Guangdong Dongguan Factory Workers: Paper Industry   https://chinastrikes.crowdmap.com/reports/view/218 
74 Guangdong Niu Shan Waijing Industrial Zone 
Factory Workers: 
Electronics  300+ https://chinastrikes.crowdmap.com/reports/view/216 
75 Hebei n/a Transportation: Bus Drivers 40+ https://chinastrikes.crowdmap.com/reports/view/225 
76 Hubei Wuhan Factory Workers: Electronics  300+ https://chinastrikes.crowdmap.com/reports/view/227 
77 Fujian Fuzhou Factory Workers: Shipyard  100+ https://chinastrikes.crowdmap.com/reports/view/233 
78 Guangdong Dongguan Factory Workers: Electronics  n/a https://chinastrikes.crowdmap.com/reports/view/226 
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79 Jiangsu Wuxi 
Factory Workers: 
Machine and 
Appliances  
1000+ https://chinastrikes.crowdmap.com/reports/view/232 
80 Sichuan Chengdu Factory Workers: Steel Workers  2,000-10,000 https://chinastrikes.crowdmap.com/reports/view/221 
81 Liaoning Dilian Factory Workers: Brewery Workers  1,000 https://chinastrikes.crowdmap.com/reports/view/223 
82 Guangxi Wuzhou Factory Workers: Toys 1,300 https://chinastrikes.crowdmap.com/reports/view/224 
83 Guangdong Dongguan Factory Workers: Toys 1,000+ https://www.wsws.org/articles/2012/jan2012/work-j17.shtml 
84 Shangdong Yantai Factory Workers: Electronics  1,000 https://chinastrikes.crowdmap.com/reports/view/230 
85 Jiangxi Jingdezhen Factory Workers: Auto Parts  2,000+ https://chinastrikes.crowdmap.com/reports/view/229 
86 Guangdong Shenzhen Factory Workers: Electronics  2,000+ https://chinastrikes.crowdmap.com/reports/view/228 
87 Guanxi Nanning Factory Workers: Electronics  8,000+ https://chinastrikes.crowdmap.com/reports/view/234 
88 Hubei Zhongxiang City Migrant Workers 300+ https://chinastrikes.crowdmap.com/reports/view/265 
89 Shanghai Minhang District 
Factory Workers: 
Machine and 
Appliances  
600+ https://chinastrikes.crowdmap.com/reports/view/268 
90 Shaanxi  Hanzhong Factory Workers: Steel Workers  5,000 https://chinastrikes.crowdmap.com/reports/view/266 
91 Zhejiang Ningbo Factory Workers: Electronics  350+ https://chinastrikes.crowdmap.com/reports/view/270 
92 Guangdong Dongguan Factory Workers: Electronics  200 https://chinastrikes.crowdmap.com/reports/view/271 
93 Guangdong Shaoxing Factory Workers: Shoe Industry  200 https://chinastrikes.crowdmap.com/reports/view/272 
94 Guangdong Meizhou Sanitation Workers  200 https://chinastrikes.crowdmap.com/reports/view/274 
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